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Framework Paper
This dissertation consists of three essays that address public regulation from a business
perspective.
Essay 1 examines product markets in which state-owned and private firms compete.
State-owned firms traditionally play an important role in providing both infrastructure and
services in network industries such as telecommunications or energy. Apart from the con-
troversial question whether a state-owned firm should be allowed to compete in a market
with private firms, it is not very well understood to what extent investment decisions of
private firms are biased. In particular, it is not clear whether state-owned firms will crowd
out investments by private firms. This concern is particularly relevant in industries where
firms must make large up-front investments to compete in the product market. So far, this
concern has been largely ignored in the literature.
We address this question using a model of rivalry between the state-owned and the
private firm and provide a formal analysis of the strategic interaction of investment and
pricing decisions by the two firms. Investments are regarded as strategic if firms do not
only take into consideration their own but also the competitor’s profit function. We examine
a duopoly model with differentiated products where the firms make demand-enhancing
investments. Importantly, the state-owned firm adheres to a “political agenda.” The political
agenda recognizes that a state-owned firm might be under political pressure from politicians
who control it.
We derive the following three key results. First, we employ a reduced-form analysis
and characterize the strategic public and private investment based on the taxonomy of Fu-
denberg and Tirole (1984). They classify investments from two perspectives: whether the
private firm regards public investment as substitutes or as complements and on how the
state-owned firm assesses the private firm’s investment. According to their taxonomy, in
three out of four scenarios the profit-maximizing behavior of both firms militates against
a crowding out of private investment. Second, we establish two conditions which must be
satisfied for the crowding out to occur: (i) the private firm regards investments as strategic
substitutes and (ii) the state-owned firm regards private investment as undesirable. Third,
we illustrate the derived scenarios with a linear demand example, which reveals that the
two conditions for a crowding out critically depend on the economic fundamentals of the
industry under study. As an example, we apply our model to the telecommunications in-
dustry where “next-generation” fibre-optic networks are being built in many industrialized
countries. In Switzerland, for instance, there is anecdotal evidence that investments in cities
where the state-owned firm and the private firm compete are more likely to be complements
than substitutes what makes a crowding out unlikely to occur.
The concern whether a state-owned firm will crowd out private investment is justified if
the two discussed conditions are satisfied. Otherwise, state-owned firms and private firms
should be allowed to compete in the same market since the state-owned firm does not have
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a strategic incentive to crowd out private investment. The analysis also shows that the
presence of a state-owned firm in a market is crucial: adhering to a political agenda is
neither necessary nor sufficient for strategic crowding out to occur.
Essay 2 studies the aftermath of the financial crisis and how several countries have used
public funds to bail out private companies. At the same time, managerial compensation
in several of these companies has soared to exorbitant amounts. A public debate about
managerial compensation in general and executive bonuses in particular has emerged and,
consequently, has forced governments to intervene with appropriate instruments. Several
countries have implemented a bonus tax on bonuses paid to managers in firms that received
bailout funds. For instance, the United States House of Representatives approved a 90%
tax on bonuses in state-supported firms. Ireland enforced a 90% tax on executives’ bonuses
in firms that received taxpayer aid. The United Kingdom introduced a 50% tax on bankers’
bonuses during several months in 2010. Switzerland’s Council of States debated taxing
executive bonuses that exceeded CHF 3 million. However, the implications of such a tax in
terms of the principal’s and agent’s incentives are not very well understood and the literature
has not yet paid enough attention to this controversial issue.
The essay addresses the incentive effect of bonus taxes by analyzing the principal’s
and agent’s behavior in a principal-agent model based on an article by Holmstrom and
Milgrom (1987). We analyze how the bonus tax impacts executive pay and then examine
the implications on the agent’s incentive to exert effort, the composition of the executive’s
compensation package (fixed salary and bonus rate) and the agent’s bonus payment and
overall salary. The principal decides on the fixed salary and the bonus rate, thereby taking
into account the agent’s participation constraint and optimal effort level. We also establish
the incentive compatibility constraint with the agent’s maximization where the principal
controls the agent’s effort level by choosing the appropriate bonus rate.
We derive three key insights. First, for a general effort cost function, the agent unam-
biguously lowers the exerted effort due to the bonus tax whereas the principal’s behavior
in terms of the salary composition depends on the agent’s risk aversion and firm specific
values. Second, counter to intuition, a higher bonus tax does not necessarily shift the com-
pensation package towards a higher fixed salary. In fact, the opposite can occur: although
the intention was to lower the bonus payment with a bonus tax, the bonus might increase
due to the levied tax. Third, we apply our results to real-world markets where our model
might help to predict how a bonus tax changes the size of the bonus rate and the agent’s
salary structure. We rely on the corresponding economic environment and the economic
fundamentals and present three examples of industries for which our model predictions are
likely to be satisfied.
The analysis suggests that the consequences of a bonus tax must be carefully considered
because the effects might run against the intended objectives. Firms simply restructure their
compensation schemes in reaction to the implementation of a bonus tax and thus it does not
eliminate the payment of exorbitant bonuses. Politicians might therefore ignore spill-over
effects that have an economic impact.
Essay 3 addresses the liberalization of regulated markets. To open up certain markets
to competition, several countries have started to liberalize regulated services or to provide
3access to networks, most notably, the liberalization of the postal sector and the provision
of network access in the telecommunications industry. In these markets, incumbents face
the challenge of addressing attacks on product quality and price. Entrants, on the other
hand, must strategically and optimally position their product in relation to the incumbent’s
product position.
Optimal market positioning of products is intensively discussed in a wide range of eco-
nomic and marketing literature. In earlier years, the literature mainly confronted the issue
from a different perspective: how existing brands serve as an indicator about how to attack
with a new brand. Hauser and Shugan (1983) challenged this traditional analysis of offen-
sive new-brand positioning and explored the defending firm’s optimal behavior if attacked
by an entrant (defender model). They did not limit the scope of strategic instruments to the
dimension of price but allowed for quality attribute adjustments as well.
In this essay, we study a more specific version of the defender model originally pio-
neered by Hauser and Shugan (1983) and explicitly model a firm’s cost structure associated
with its product attributes. Hence, we enrich the original model by adding more struc-
ture and specifically model the cost associated with quality attributes in a profit function.
The results allow to devise optimal defending strategies based on industry specific cost and
market structures. Applying these insights to the postal sector and the telecommunications
industry, we identify and explain certain market peculiarities. In the model, two firms com-
pete in three dimensions: two quality attributes which impact fixed and variable costs and
product pricing.
We derive two key results. First, we calculate the two incumbent’s reaction tables based
on the firm’s cost structure (rate between fixed and variable costs). The analysis reveals
how an incumbent’s reaction critically depends on its market share and on the firm’s cost
structure. Second, we apply the established results to the postal sector and to the telecom-
munications industry and explain observed investment behaviors of firms in these markets.
The postal sector has traditionally relied on a reserved area to finance the universal
service obligations. Recently, many countries have started to liberalize this area and open
it up to competition. The prospect of profit attracts new firms that mainly compete in the
least cost product segment. Thus, they will choose a very selective market entry and not
deliver to rural and less dense areas where expensive technology is required. The incumbent
already owns high cost technology to satisfy the universal service obligations.
Policy makers must be aware of these market forces when liberalizing the postal sec-
tor. In order to ensure that people in rural and less populated areas will be served, the
government must provide benefits to attract firms there (e.g., subsidizing certain services).
In the telecommunications industry, regulation plays a crucial role in encouraging mar-
ket entries and maintaining competition. We provide a consistent theoretical framework
for the empirical evidence derived by Grajek and Ro¨ller (2012) and Briglauer, Ecker, and
Gugler (2012). They highlight the inherent regulation/investment trade-off that access reg-
ulation might lead to higher competition and lower prices but also undermines investment
incentives over time. We confirm this relationship: an investment in an own network by the
entrant encourages the incumbent to enhance its network quality as well. If access regu-
lation is provided, the entrant attacks with a technology that creates services based on the
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incumbent’s infrastructure and need not bear the fixed costs to build its own network.
Recently, fibre deployment of future telecommunication is a fiercely debated challenge
of regulators and investing firms at the same time. There, the prospective to a grant net-
work access in the future might prevent potential firms from investing. If network access
is granted, conditions must be set such that the network provider keeps investing in net-
work quality and network maintenance. A lack of access regulation eventually leads to
infrastructure competition but also to a duplication of the network infrastructure.
Our analysis reveals the challenges that governments face when liberalizing markets.
They have to design a legal framework which correctly incentivizes all parties.
References
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1When Do State-Owned Firms Crowd Out Private
Investment?∗
joint with Stefan Buehler
Abstract
This essay examines the conditions under which a state-owned firm with a political agenda
strategically crowds out investment by a private firm. Employing reduced-form analysis,
we show that strategic crowding out occurs if (i) the private firm regards investments as
strategic substitutes, and (ii) private investment is undesirable from the state-owned firm’s
perspective. We discuss how our analysis applies to real-world markets and argue that
it provides an explanation for the ambivalent evidence on the effect of public on private
investment: State ownership is neither necessary nor sufficient for crowding out to occur.
1.1 Introduction
Competition between state-owned firms and private firms is a commonplace phenomenon
in market economies. Traditionally, state-owned firms play an important role in the provi-
sion of network infrastructure in telecommunications, energy, and railroads, but they also
operate in many other industries. La Porta, de Silanes, and Shleifer (2002) and Andrianova,
Demetriades, and Shortland (2012), for instance, show that government ownership of banks
∗This essay has been published in the Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade. Copy-
right c© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013. The final publication is available at
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10842-013-0164-y. It is reprinted here with kind permission.
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is pervasive around the world.1 Also, it is well known that state-owned firms compete with
private firms in extracting crude oil and other crude materials, manufacturing aircraft and
cars, broadcasting, education, health care, insurance, etc.
While there has been considerable debate regarding the pros and cons of state-owned
firms (we will discuss the related literature in Section 2),2 the strategic interaction of invest-
ment decisions by state-owned and private firms is not very well understood. In particular,
the literature has largely ignored the common concern that state-owned firms might crowd
out investment by private firms. This concern is particularly relevant in industries where
firms must make large up-front investments (e.g., in building network infrastructure, en-
hancing product design, ramping up advertising campaigns, etc.) to compete effectively in
the product market.
In this essay, we provide a formal analysis of the strategic interaction of investment and
pricing decisions by state-owned and private firms, and we work out the conditions under
which a state-owned firm strategically crowds out investment by a private firm. Specifi-
cally, we model the rivalry between a state-owned firm and a private firm as a duopoly with
differentiated products, allowing for the possibility that the state-owned firm adheres to a
“political agenda.” In doing so, we account for the fact that the state-owned firm might
be under political pressure from the politicians who control it (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994;
Bennedsen, 2000).3 Assuming that firms make demand-enhancing investments before they
compete in the product market, we employ reduced-form analysis and the taxonomy of busi-
ness strategies introduced by Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) to characterize strategic public
and private investment.
Our key result is that, for strategic crowding out to occur, two conditions must be satis-
fied: (i) the private firm regards investments as strategic substitutes; (ii) private investment
is “undesirable” from the state-owned firm’s perspective. The intuition for this result is
straightforward. If the private firm regards investments as strategic substitutes (comple-
ments, respectively), an increase in the state-owned firm’s investment reduces (increases)
private investment. Consequently, public investment can crowd out private investment only
if the private firm regards investments as strategic substitutes (condition (i)). Moreover, the
state-owned firm must have an incentive to strategically crowd out private investment. This
incentive is generated by an adverse effect of private investment on the state-owned firm,
in which case private investment is undesirable from the state-owned firm’s perspective
(condition (ii)). We will make this intuition more precise below.
Our analysis provides a consistent explanation for the ambivalent empirical evidence
on the effect of public investment on private investment (David, Hall, and Toole, 2000):4
1In a related paper, La Porta, de Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) find that, in 28 wealthy economies around
the world, large firms are typically controlled by families or the state.
2A special report by The Economist (January 21, 2012) on “State Capitalism” provides a useful survey of
the public debate.
3Our analytical framework will also allow for the possibility that the private firm does not maximize
profits.
4These authors survey the evidence on public investment accumulated over 35 years. A more recent paper
by Gonza´lez and Pazo´ (2008) examines whether public subsidies stimulate private R&D spending of Spanish
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Since the extent to which conditions (i) and (ii) are satisfied depends on the details of the
industry under study, estimates of the effect of public investment on private investment are
unlikely to be robust across industries. The linear demand example considered in Section
1.4 below illustrates this: Allowing for a business-stealing effect of private investment is
sufficient to turn strategic complements into strategic substitutes, even if everything else
remains unchanged.
To see how our analysis can be applied to real-world markets, consider the telecommu-
nications industry where “next-generation” fibre-optic networks are being built in many in-
dustrialized countries (Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications, 2010;
Noam, 2010). In Switzerland, for instance, there are several cities (e.g., Basel, Geneva, and
Zurich) in which both the local public utility and Swisscom, the country’s leading telecom-
munications operator, invest in fibre-optic networks. There is anecdotal evidence that, in
some of these cities, the local public utility’s investment has encouraged Swisscom’s in-
vestment (cf. Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications, 2010, pp. 8).
This suggests that investments in fibre-optic networks in urban areas are viewed as strategic
complements (rather than substitutes) in Switzerland, such that strategic crowding out is
unlikely to be a concern.5
We are well aware that our simple analytical framework necessarily provides an incom-
plete description of the rivalry between state-owned firms and private firms in real-world
markets. In particular, it treats the political pressure on the state-owned firm in a reduced-
form manner and does not derive the political agenda from first principles. Nevertheless,
we are convinced that our analytical framework captures the essence of strategic interaction
in public and private investments in many real-world markets. Our analysis shows that the
role of state ownership in explaining strategic crowding out is subtle: Adhering to a political
agenda is neither necessary nor sufficient for strategic crowding out to occur.
The remainder of this essay is structured as follows. In Section 1.2, we discuss the
related literature. Section 1.3 introduces the analytical framework, motivates the model-
ing of the political agenda, and identifies the conditions under which the state-owned firm
practices strategic crowding out. In Section 1.4, we illustrate our analysis with a simple
linear demand example. Section 1.5 discusses implications of our analysis, and Section 1.6
concludes.
1.2 Related Literature
The economic analysis of state-owned firms has made great progress over the last few
decades. In this section, we briefly discuss how our essay relates to three relevant strands
of the literature.
First, our essay adds to the debate on state versus private ownership. In an authoritative
survey of this debate, Shleifer (1998, p. 138) rejects the view (widely held in the 1940s)
manufacturing firms. They find no evidence for crowding out.
5It is worth noting that the strategic complementarity in investments is often supported by cooperation
contracts between the local public utilities and Swisscom.
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that government production is broadly desirable and makes a case for the “superiority of
private ownership”. Based on Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990), Hart
(1995), and Hart, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997), he argues that private ownership provides
stronger incentives to reduce cost and invest in non-contractible quality or innovation. State
ownership is thus desirable only if efficient production requires soft incentives (e.g., to
avoid cost cutting that has adverse effects on non-contractible quality). The balance is
further tilted against state ownership, as state-owned firms might be under political pressure
from the politicians who control them to transfer resources to their supporters (Shleifer and
Vishny, 1994; Bennedsen, 2000).6
Our analysis builds on these insights and allows for the possibility that a state-owned
firm adheres to a political agenda.7 However, since we want to focus on the strategic in-
teraction of public and private investments, we represent the political pressure on a firm
in a reduced-form manner by a simple policy agenda function which depends on the en-
dogenous variables of our model (i.e., prices and investments). This is in line with Vickers
and Yarrow (1988, 1991) and allows us to confine ourselves to a simple two-stage game
framework to study strategic crowding out.
Second, our essay adds to the “mixed” oligopoly literature, which typically makes the
peculiar assumption that state-owned firms maximize welfare and compete with profit-
maximizing private firms (i.e., firms are not allowed to adhere to a political agenda). Cre-
mer, Marchand, and Thisse (1991) and Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse (1997), for in-
stance, analyze mixed price competition with differentiated products, but these authors
abstract from endogenous investments. A number of papers have integrated endogenous
public and private investments into very specific models of mixed oligopoly (e.g. Delbono
and Denicolo`, 1993; Poyago-Theotoky, 1999; Matsumura and Matsushima, 2004; Ishibashi
and Matsumura, 2006). It is important to note, though, that none of these papers considers
demand-enhancing investments or provides a taxonomy of strategic investment behavior.
Third, our analysis sheds new light on the empirical evidence on the interaction of public
and private investment. As noted above, the evidence on the interaction of public and private
investment is ambivalent. The extensive survey by David, Hall, and Toole (2000, p. 525)
deliberately avoids “any definitive empirical conclusions regarding the sign and magnitude
of the relationship between public and private R&D”. This reluctance is justified on the
grounds that there is no unified framework for the analysis of the interaction of investments
at the micro and macro level, and that it is difficult to compare empirical studies which
focus on the impact of different types of public investment.8
By offering a simple but general taxonomy of strategic investment at the firm level, our
essay helps to organize the micro-level evidence on the interaction of public and private
6Similar arguments are put forward in favor of privatizing state-owned firms. Important theoretical contri-
butions to the privatization literature include Laffont and Tirole (1991), Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny (1996),
Schmidt (1996a,b), and Che (2009). Megginson and Netter (2001) provide a survey of the empirical evidence.
7In line with Glaeser and Shleifer (2001), we also allow for the possibility that the private firm does not
maximize profits.
8The latter problem is also emphasized by Laopodis (2001), who examines the effects of military and
non-military public expenditures on gross private investment in four different European economies.
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investment. It highlights the importance of accounting for market-specific details to under-
stand the interaction of public and private investment. The effect of public investment on
private investment may vary considerably across industries.
1.3 Model
1.3.1 Basic Setup
We consider a duopoly model with differentiated products indexed by i, j = 1, 2.9 Product
demand is given by Di(p, θ), where p = (pi, pj) and θ = (θi, θj), i 6= j, denote prices and
investments, respectively. We consider a two-stage game in which firms make investments
in the first stage and compete in prices in the second stage.
We impose the following (standard) assumptions on the demand and cost functions:
A 1.1. Products are demand substitutes, i.e., ∂Di/∂pi < 0, and ∂Di/∂pj ≥ 0, i, j = 1, 2,
i 6= j.
A 1.2. Investment strictly increases own demand and weakly decreases demand for the
other product, i.e., ∂Di/∂θi > 0 and ∂Dj/∂θi ≤ 0, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j.
A 1.3. Firms face constant marginal costs ci ≥ 0 and make investments at convex cost
Fi(θi), i = 1, 2.
Using Assumptions (A 1.1)-(A 1.3), firm i’s profits in the second stage are given by
pii(p, θ) = (pi − ci)Di(p, θ)− Fi(θi).
Now, following Vickers and Yarrow (1988, 1991) and building on Shleifer (1998) and
Bennedsen (2000), we allow for the possibility that firm i adheres to a “political agenda”
Ai(p, θ), such that it effectively maximizes the objective function
Πi(p, θ) = pii(p, θ) + λiAi(p, θ),
where λi ∈ {0, 1} indicates whether firm i’s behavior is affected by a political agenda. No-
tice that, just like the profit function pii, the political agenda Ai depends on the endogenous
variables (p, θ). The political agenda can thus be interpreted to provide a measure of the
“political profit” generated by a particular choice of prices and investments.
To ensure existence and uniqueness of a price equilibrium, we impose the following
assumption:
A 1.4. Prices are strategic complements (∂2Πi/(∂pi∂pj) ≥ 0), and the contraction condi-
tion ∂2Πi/(∂pi)2 + |∂2Πi/(∂pi∂pj)| < 0 holds (Gallego et al., 2006; Vives, 2001).
9Under appropriate assumptions, our reduced-form analysis generalizes naturally beyond the duopoly
setting.
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Finally, to simplify exposition, we let εij ≡ −(∂Dj/∂pi)/(Dj/pi) denote the price
elasticity of demand, and we define Xˆii ≡ (∂Xi/∂pj)(∂pj/∂θi) + ∂Xi/∂θi and Xˆij ≡
(∂Xi/∂pj)(∂pj/∂θj) + ∂Xi/∂θj , respectively. This notation allows us to represent the
first-order conditions in a convenient form.
Applying the envelope theorem, prices and investments in the interior subgame-perfect
Nash equilibrium satisfy the first-order conditions
pi − ci
pi
=
1
εii
(
1 + λi
1
Di
∂Ai
∂pi
)
, (1.1)
(pi − ci)Dˆii + λiAˆii =
∂Fi
∂θi
. (1.2)
Equations (1.1) and (1.2) nest the standard duopoly (where both firms maximize profits,
λ1 = λ2 = 0), the mixed duopoly (where one firm maximizes profits, λ1 6= λ2), and
the welfare benchmark (λ1 = λ2 = 1) as special cases.10 They indicate that the political
agenda Ai plays an intuitive role for equilibrium pricing and investment: The derivatives of
Ai with respect to pi and θi, respectively, determine the extent to which equilibrium prices
and investments are distorted away from standard profit-maximizing choices. For instance,
if the political pressure on state-owned firm i is such that its political agenda function is
decreasing in own price (∂Ai/∂pi < 0), the equilibrium price pi is distorted downwards.
Similarly, if the political agenda function is increasing in own investment (Aˆii > 0), the
equilibrium investment θi is distorted upwards.
1.3.2 Identifying Crowding Out
We now study the conditions under which the state-owned firm will strategically crowd out
private investment, using the taxonomy of business strategies introduced by Fudenberg and
Tirole (1984).11
Let us first consider the condition under which investment by firm j is desirable from
firm i’s point of view. We say that investment by firm j is desirable from firm i’s perspective
(i.e., makes firm j “soft”) if
dΠi
dθj
= (pi − ci)Dˆij + λiAˆij > 0, (1.3)
whereas investment is undesirable (makes firm j “tough”) if dΠi/dθj < 0. Put differently,
firm j’s investment is desirable from firm i’s point of view if it increases the value of its
objective function. It is important to note that firm i’s political agenda may affect its assess-
ment of investments by firm j. For instance, a positive effect of firm j’s investment on firm
i’s political agenda (i.e., Aˆij > 0) may dominate a negative effect on profits (dpii/dθj < 0),
leading to a positive overall assessment of firm j’s investment (dΠi/dθj > 0).
10In the latter cases, a state-owned firm maximizes social welfare by assumption, such that Ai = pij +∫
Didpi +
∫
Djdpj , i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j.
11Functions are evaluated at equilibrium quantities throughout this section.
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Next, consider the nature of strategic interaction in investment decisions. From firm j’s
point of view, investments are strategic substitutes if
∂2Πj
∂θj∂θi
=
∂Dˆjj
∂θi
(pj − cj) + Dˆjj
∂pj
∂θi
+ λj
∂Aˆjj
∂θi
< 0 (1.4)
and strategic complements if ∂2Πj/(∂θj∂θi) > 0 (cf. Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer,
1985). Intuitively, if investments are strategic substitutes (complements, respectively), the
optimal investment of firm j decreases (increases) with investment by firm i. Again, it is
important to note that the political agenda might affect firm j’s assessment of the nature of
strategic interaction. In particular, a negative impact of firm i’s investment on the effect of
firm j’s investment on its own political agenda (i.e., ∂Aˆjj/∂θi < 0) may change the sign of
∂2Πj/(∂θj∂θi) from positive to negative.
Using equations (1.3) and (1.4), Table 1.1 characterizes the strategic interaction in in-
vestments by a state-owned firm and a private firm. We assume that the row player is the
state-owned firm i which maximizes Πi and adheres to a political agenda (i.e., λi = 1),
whereas the column player is the private firm j which maximizes profits pij (i.e., λj = 0).12
Table 1.1: Strategic Investment by a State-Owned Firm with a Political Agenda
Private firm j regards inv. as
strat. substitutes strat. complements
∂2pij
∂θj∂θi
< 0
∂2pij
∂θj∂θi
> 0
desirable underinvestment overinvestment
dΠi
dθj
> 0 “puppy dog” “fat cat”
State-owned firm i
finds private inv.
undesirable overinvestment underinvestment
dΠi
dθj
< 0 “top dog” “lean & hungry look”
crowding out
Desirable Private Investment
Let us first consider the case where private investment is desirable from the state-owned
firm’s point of view (dΠi/dθj > 0). Clearly, in this case, the state-owned firm will want to
strategically promote (rather than crowd out) private investment. To do so, the state-owned
12The extension to the case where firm j also adheres to a political agenda is straightforward.
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firm will adopt a “puppy dog” strategy (i.e., strategically underinvest) if investments are
strategic substitutes from the private firm’s point of view. If the private firm regards invest-
ments as strategic complements, however, the state-owned firm will adopt a “fat cat” strat-
egy (i.e., strategically overinvest) to promote private investment. It is worth emphasizing
that, if the state-owned firm strategically overinvests, it does so to boost private investment.
Undesirable Private Investment
Consider now the case where private investment is undesirable from the state-owned firm’s
point of view (dΠi/dθj < 0). In this setting, the state-owned firm will indeed want to
strategically reduce private investment. To do so, it will adopt a “top dog” strategy (i.e.,
strategically overinvest) if investments are strategic substitutes and a “lean & hungry look”
strategy (i.e., strategically underinvest) if investments are strategic complements from the
private firm’s point of view. This implies that the only setting in which the state-owned
firm overinvests to strategically crowd out private investments is the top dog setting (i.e.,
crowding out does not automatically follow from strategic substitutes).
Summary
Table 1 highlights that, for strategic crowding out to occur, two conditions need to be satis-
fied: (i) the private firm regards investments as strategic substitutes; (ii) private investment
is not desirable from the state-owned firm’s perspective. Note that there is only one way
in which the political agenda can cause strategic crowding out: It might render private in-
vestment undesirable rather than desirable—i.e., change the sign of dΠi/dθj from positive
to negative “for political reasons”—when the private firm regards investments as strategic
substitutes. Otherwise, strategic overinvestment will either also be practiced by a private
firm without a political agenda (if dΠi/dθj is negative to begin with) or it will boost private
investment (if investments are strategic complements from the private firm’s perspective).
Adhering to a political agenda is thus neither necessary nor sufficient for crowding out to
occur.
1.4 Linear Demand Example
We illustrate our analysis with a linear demand example for which we can derive closed-
form solutions for equilibrium prices and investments. Specifically, we assume that demand
is given by
Di(p, θ) = α− βpi + γpj + θi − τθj ,
where α > 0 and β > γ > 0 are parameters and τ ∈ {0, 1} indicates whether investment
has a direct business-stealing effect.13 Let firm 1 be the state-owned firm (λ1 = 1) and
assume, for simplicity, that its political agenda is to maximize total investment, i.e.,
A1(p, θ) = ω(θ1 + θ2),
13This demand function satisfies the relevant assumptions (A 1.1) and (A 1.2).
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where ω ≥ 0 measures the weight of the political agenda.14 Suppose that firm 2 is privately
owned and maximizes profits (λ2 = 0). Finally, assume that marginal costs are normalized
to zero (c1 = c2 = 0) and that investment costs are quadratic, i.e., Fi(θi) = θ2i .
Let us now employ Table 1 to characterize equilibrium behavior. Tedious but straight-
forward calculations show that, from firm 2’s perspective,
∂2pi2
∂θ2∂θ1
=
2β(2β − γτ)(γ − 2βτ)
(4β2 − γ2)2
,
such that, from the private firm’s perspective, investments are strategic substitutes if they
give rise to business stealing (i.e., ∂2pi2/(∂θ2∂θ1)|τ=1 < 0) and strategic complements in
the absence of business stealing (i.e., ∂2pi2/(∂θ2∂θ1)|τ=0 > 0).
Firm 1’s optimal behavior also depends on the weight of its political agenda. To see this,
notice that dΠ1/dθ2 is negative at ω(τ) = 015 and monotone increasing in ω. There is thus
a critical weight ω∗(τ) below (above) which investment by the private firm 2 is undesirable
(desirable, respectively) from the state-owned firm’s perspective. As a result, depending
on parameter values, one of the strategies listed in Table 1 will be adopted in equilibrium.
Figure 1.1 illustrates the different scenarios for the parameter values α = 0.5, β = 1, and
γ = 0.7.
First, consider the case of strategic substitutes (τ = 1). Panel A shows that the reaction
functions R1(ω) and R2 are downward-sloping, and that an increase in the weight of the
political agenda ω shifts out the state-owned firm’s reaction function R1(ω). Intuitively,
this shift follows from the fact that, for any given level of private investment, the best-
response investment of the state-owned firm is higher, as an increase in ω makes public
investment more valuable. Panel B highlights that firm 1 adopts a top dog (puppy dog)
strategy for ω(τ) below (above, respectively) the critical weight ω∗(1). That is, the state-
owned firm 1 strategically crowds out (i.e., overinvests to reduce private investment) if
investments are strategic substitutes and the weight of the political agenda ω is sufficiently
small.16 However, if the weight of the political agenda becomes sufficiently large, the state-
owned firm strategically underinvests, because private investment is now desirable due to
the political agenda, but investments remain strategic substitutes from the private firm’s
perspective. Panel B also shows that equilibrium investments are symmetric and do not
vary in ω if both firms solely maximize profits (λi = 0, i = 1, 2).
Next, consider the case of strategic complements (τ = 0). Panel C shows that the
reaction functions R1(ω) and R2 are now upward-sloping, and that an increase in ω again
shifts out R1(ω) (as above, the intuition is that public investment becomes more valuable).
Panel D highlights that, for the given parameter values, firm 1 adopts a fat cat strategy for
any admissible ω(τ) ≥ 0. The state-owned firm 1 will thus never adopt a lean & hungry
14Such a political agenda may be induced, for instance, by a concern for sufficient infrastructure invest-
ments.
15This immediately implies that a privately owned firm 1 (without a political agenda) would find investment
by firm 2 undesirable.
16Notice that crowding out would also be practiced by a privately owned firm 1.
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look strategy.17 Again, investments do not vary in ω if both firms solely maximize profits.
Strategic Substitutes (τ = 1)
Strategic Complements (τ = 0)
0
0.5
0 0.5
θ2
θ1
45◦R1(ω = 0)
R1(ω = ω
∗(1))
R2
(A) Reaction Functions
0
0.5
0 2
θ1, θ2
ω
crowding out
top dog puppy dog
θ1
θ2
θi(λi = 0), i = 1, 2
ω∗(1)
dΠ1
dθ2
= 0
(B) Equilibrium Investments
0
1
0 1
θ2
θ1
45◦R1(ω = 0)
R1(ω =
1
4 )
R2
(C) Reaction Functions
0
1
0 2
θ1, θ2
ω
fat cat
θ1
θ2
θi(λi = 0), i = 1, 2
(D) Equilibrium Investments
Figure 1.1: Reaction functions and equilibrium investments with linear demand and politi-
cal agenda A1 = ω(θ1 + θ2)
17The critical weight ω∗(0) below which firm 1 would adopt a lean & hungry look strategy is negative.
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1.5 Implications
Our analysis highlights that, for strategic crowding out to occur, two conditions must be
satisfied: (i) the private firm regards investments as strategic substitutes, and (ii) private
investment is undesirable from the state-owned firm’s perspective. In principle, it is thus
straightforward to check whether crowding out is a concern in a particular industry: all one
needs to do is check whether these conditions are satisfied in the industry under study.
In practice, it is convenient to adopt a two-step procedure: First, one should look for evi-
dence that investments are strategic complements (such that crowding out cannot occur). In
the introduction, we have used this approach to understand the interaction of public and pri-
vate investments in next-generation telecommunication networks in Switzerland. Based on
anecdotal evidence, we have argued that the relevant Swiss firms seem to regard investments
as strategic complements and concluded that crowding out is unlikely to be a concern. Sec-
ond, if investments are likely to be strategic substitutes, one should look for hints whether
private investment is undesirable from the state-owned firm’s perspective. Private invest-
ment is typically undesirable if it has a business-stealing effect or another adverse effect on
a state-owned firm with a political agenda. The latter may reflect, for example, a concern
for goods such as public health (e.g., alcoholic beverages, health insurance, immunization),
public security (e.g., fire service, property insurance, security services), or environmen-
tal protection (e.g., solar power, waste disposal). In such industries, it is plausible that a
state-owned firm might want to practice strategic crowding out.
This two-stage procedure offers a simple micro-founded approach to predict whether
crowding out is a problem in a particular industry. It should be clear that, while this pro-
cedure arguably works well at the micro level, it is ill-suited to guide empirical work on
crowding out at the macro level.
1.6 Conclusion
This essay has analyzed the conditions under which a state-owned firm with a political
agenda strategically crowds out investment by a private firm. Employing a simple reduced-
form two-stage game, we have shown that a state-owned firm strategically crowds out pri-
vate investment in markets where the private firm regards investments as strategic substi-
tutes and private investment is undesirable from the state-owned firm’s perspective. Our
analytical framework captures the essence of strategic interaction in investments in mixed
markets, and it suggests a simple two-step procedure to test whether crowding out is likely
to be a concern in a particular industry.
Our analysis shows that state ownership plays a subtle role in explaining strategic
crowding out: The political agenda causes crowding out only if it actually makes private
investment undesirable when investments are strategic substitutes. Otherwise, crowding out
will either also be practiced by a private firm, or public investment will boost private invest-
ment. State ownership is thus neither necessary nor sufficient for crowding out to occur.
This helps to explain why it has been difficult to provide convincing empirical evidence on
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the effect of public investment on private investment.
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2Incentive Effects of Bonus Taxes in a
Principal-Agent Model∗
joint with Helmut M. Dietl, Martin Grossmann, and Markus Lang
Abstract
Several countries have implemented bonus taxes for corporate executives in response to the
current financial crisis. Using a principal-agent model, this essay investigates the incentive
effects of bonus taxes by analyzing the agent’s and principal’s behavior. Specifically, we
show how bonus taxes affect the agent’s incentives to exert effort and the principal’s deci-
sion regarding the composition of the compensation package (fixed salary and bonus rate).
We find that, surprisingly, a bonus tax can increase the bonus rate and decrease the fixed
salary if the agent is highly risk averse. Additionally, a bonus tax can induce the principal to
pay higher bonuses even though the agent’s effort unambiguously decreases. Nevertheless,
a bonus tax reduces the overall salary of the agent. Further results are derived with respect
to the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium for a general effort cost function.
2.1 Introduction
In response to the current financial crisis, several countries have implemented bonus taxes
for corporate executives in firms that received large amounts of federal bailout funds. For
example, the United States House of Representatives approved a 90% tax on bonuses in
∗This essay has been published in the Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Vol. 89, May 2013,
93–104, Copyright c© 2013 Elsevier B.V. It is reprinted here with kind permission.
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such firms. Similarly, Ireland introduced in January 2011 a 90% tax on executives’ bonuses
in banks that received government support. Moreover, in the United Kingdom, a bonus
tax of 50% was imposed on bankers’ bonuses for a period of several months in 2010.
In Switzerland, the Council of States discussed proposals to introduce a tax on executive
bonuses above CHF 3 million.
Despite their political relevance, the economic effects of bonus taxes have received little
attention in academic research. This essay tries to fill part of this gap by developing basic
insights into the functioning and consequences of bonus taxes on executive pay based on
the principal-agent model of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987). We introduce a tax that is
levied on the agent’s bonus to analyze how it affects the agent’s incentive to exert effort, the
composition of executives’ compensation packages (fixed salary and bonus rate) as well as
the agent’s bonus payment and overall salary. The objective of this essay, however, is not
to provide a normative analysis about the desirability of bonus taxes but rather, given their
existence in the real world, to analyze the incentive effects of such taxes.
In our model, the principal chooses the fixed salary and the bonus rate by satisfying the
agent’s participation constraint and anticipating the agent’s optimal effort level. For a gen-
eral effort cost function, the agent unambiguously reacts to a higher bonus tax with lower
effort, while the behavior of the principal depends on the agent’s degree of risk aversion
and the variance in the firm value. Basic intuition might suggest that by taxing the agent’s
bonus, the compensation package is shifted to the fixed salary. However, the opposite can
occur if the agent is highly risk averse and/or the variance in the firm value is large. More-
over, a bonus tax can lead to the counterintuitive result that both the fixed salary and the
bonus rate increase. Surprisingly, a higher bonus tax can induce the principal to pay higher
bonuses even though the agent exerts less effort. However, the overall salary of the agent
unambiguously decreases through a bonus tax. Further results are derived with respect to
the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium for a general effort cost function.
The remainder of this essay is structured as follows. Section 2.2 briefly reviews the re-
lated literature. Section 2.3 introduces our principal-agent model with its main assumptions
and notations in Subsection 2.3.1. In Subsection 2.3.2, we solve the model and present the
optimality conditions and equilibria. In Subsection 2.3.3, we compute the effects of bonus
taxes on the equilibrium outcomes. Finally, Section 2.4 discusses the main insights and
presents our conclusions.
2.2 Related Literature
Despite the large body of literature and numerous theoretical and empirical studies on exec-
utive compensation, only a few papers have addressed the consequences of executive com-
pensation regulation in general and the effects of bonus taxes in particular. For example,
Dew-Becker (2009) reviews the history of government rules and regulations in the United
States that affect executive compensation. By discussing disclosure rules, advancements in
corporate governance, and say-on-pay, Dew-Becker analyzes the evolution of pay regula-
tion and concludes that mandatory say-on-pay could be the most effective and least harmful
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measure of controlling executive compensation. Knutt (2005) examines diverse regulatory
issues from a legal point of view. He claims that the various attempts to regulate executive
compensation, such as the disclosure and tax regulations, have not yet been effective.
Hall and B. (2000) analyze the extent to which tax policy influences the composition
of executive compensation and discuss the consequences of rising stock-based pay.1 Their
empirical study shows that the dramatic explosion in executive stock-option pay since 1980
cannot be attributed to tax rate changes. Moreover, the so-called million dollar rule induced
a substitution from fixed salary toward performance-related pay. Unlike Hall and B. (2000),
who concentrate on a tax on stock-based pay, we study a tax that is levied on the agent’s
bonus.
Radulescu (2010) analyzes the effects of bonus taxes in a two-country, principal-agent
model with relocation possibilities for the managers. The paper focuses on tax incidence
and analyzes the effects of bonus taxes on firm profits, dividends and welfare in the case
of a quadratic effort cost function. The paper shows that a bonus tax induces lower profits
and dividends so that the incidence is borne by the shareholders. The welfare implica-
tions of bonus taxes depends on the relocation possibilities for the managers. In contrast
to our model, in which we focus on the incentive effects of bonus taxes for a general cost
function and derive an ambiguous effect of a bonus tax on the fixed and variable salary,
Radulescu (2010) finds that the effort-based compensation component (bonus) unambigu-
ously increases with a higher bonus tax.2
Finally, there is now a growing literature on regulating incentive pay in the financial
sector.3 For example, Hakenes and Schnabel (2012) show that the presence of bailout guar-
antees induce bankers to increase their risk-taking behavior and lead to a steeper compensa-
tion scheme. An upper limit on the bonus could alleviate these problems. Bolton, Mehran,
and Shapiro (2010) develop a theoretical model to show that the credit default swap reduces
risk taking of executives at highly levered financial firms. Based on a model of workers in
the financial sector, Besley and Ghatak (2011) show that bailouts induce lower effort and
higher risk taking.
1Based on a large sample of US firms during 1994–2004, Tzioumis (2008) empirically analyzes how the
adaptation of CEO stock option plans is influenced by CEO and firm characteristics. Palmon et al. (2008)
determine the optimal strike prices of stock options for executives in a simulation model.
2Cun˜at and Guadalupe (2009) utilize a panel of US executives and find that an increase in the financial
sector through deregulations in the 1990s induced an increase in the variable and a decrease in the fixed
components of executive pay. Using data from Germany, Kraft and Niederpru¨m (1999) show that a higher
variance in firm profits decreases the variable salary component. Finally, Graziano and Parigi (1998) show in
a principal agent model that more competition represented by a higher number of firms induces the agent to
decrease efforts in the case of a low product differentiation.
3Bebchuk and Spamann (2010) identify the underlying mechanisms regarding the compensation structures
for bankers that have produced incentives for excessive risk-taking.
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2.3 Model
2.3.1 Notations and Assumptions
Our model is based on the principal-agent model of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) and in-
troduces a tax denoted by τ ∈ (0, 1) that is levied on the agent’s variable salary (bonus). We
consider a single-period employment relationship in a firm between a risk-neutral principal
(e.g., a firm’s owner) and a risk-averse agent (e.g., CEO). The agent chooses the unobserv-
able action (effort) a ∈ R+0 to produce a firm value given by x = a + ε, where ε is a
normally distributed error term with ε ∼ N(0, σ2ε ) representing potential effects on the firm
value beyond the agent’s control.4 A high variance in the error term σ2ε can be interpreted
as a more uncertain economic environment that creates a high variance in the firm value or
a situation in which the agent’s performance cannot be measured precisely.
Because the principal can only observe the firm value x, the agent’s effort a cannot be
specified in a legally enforceable contract. The agent’s effort generates costs according to a
strictly convex cost function c(a) ∈ C3 that satisfies
A 2.1. c′(a) > 0, c′′(a) > 0 for a > 0, c′(0) = c′′(0) = 0. Moreover, c′′′(a) ≥ 0 for a ≥ 0
and lim
a→∞
c′(a) =∞.
In line with the agency literature, we assume that the principal offers the agent a linear
employment contract that generates a payoff to the agent according to5
w(x) ≡ s+ (1− τ)bx = s+ (1− τ)b(a + ε),
where s ∈ R+0 is the fixed salary component and bx is the variable salary or bonus payment
given by the principal. We follow Gibbons (1998, p. 116) and refer to the incentive-based
component b ∈ (0, 1) as the bonus rate.6 It should be noted that the gross salary paid by the
principal is given by W (x) ≡ s+ bx, and that w(x) ≡ s+(1− τ)bx is the net-of-tax salary
received by the agent. The state receives the difference between gross and net salary as tax
revenue τbx. We further assume that the agent has an exogenously-given outside option,
represented by his reservation utility û ∈ R+0 . The reservation utility can be interpreted as
4Because we want to focus on the incentive effects of bonus taxes in a microeconomic environment of a
firm and its employee, we neglect possible negative externalities of the agent’s behavior on the economy as
a whole. Hence, in our model, we do not analyze how a bonus tax might correct potential inefficiencies of
the employment contract between the principal and the agent. Moreover, we do not aim to investigate how a
bonus tax influences the risk-taking behavior of corporate executives.
5Linear contracts are widely used in the literature because of their analytical convenience (see, e.g.,
Feltham and Xie, 1994; Baker, 2002; Hughes, Zhang, and Xie, 2005). Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) found
the optimal dynamic compensation scheme to be linear for certain intertemporal contracting problems where
the agent controls a stationary technology. Hellwig and Schmidt (2002) show that the result of Holmstrom
and Milgrom (1987) does not only apply to continuous-time but also to discrete-time settings.
6Note that in the literature on executive compensation b is also referred to as the pay-performance sensi-
tivity (PPS) or piece rate (see, e.g., Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Murphy, 1999; Conyon and Sadler, 2001; and
Faulkender et al., 2010).
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the utility the agent would receive in another firm or in a country without a bonus tax and
therefore is assumed to be exogenous.7
From the properties of the normal distribution, we derive that the agent’s (net-of-tax)
salary w(x) is also normally distributed with
w(x) ∼ N
(
s+ (1− τ)ba; (1 − τ)2b2σ2ε
)
.
Thus, the expected salary of the agent is given by E[w] = s + (1 − τ)ba ≡ w, and the
variance of the salary is V [w] = (1− τ)2b2σ2ε ≡ σ2w.
We assume that the agent is risk-averse with a constant absolute risk-averse (CARA)
utility function that is given by the negative exponential function U(w, a) = −e−r(w−c(a)),
where r ∈ R+ is the Arrow-Pratt measure of the agent’s degree of absolute risk aversion.
The expected value of this utility yields E[U ] ≡
∫
U(w, a)f(w)dw, where f(w) is the
probability density function of w. Because the salary is normally distributed with w ∼
N(w, σ2w), the expected value of the agent’s utility is given by E[U ] = −e−r(w−c(a)−rσ
2
w/2)
.
Using a monotonic transformation, which preserves the ordering, we conclude that the
agent’s expected net utility E[UA] yields
E[UA] ≡ s+ (1− τ)ba−
rσ2ε
2
(1− τ)2b2 − c(a).
The net utility is the certainty equivalent minus costs, where (1/2)rσ2ε(1− τ)2b2 character-
izes the agent’s risk premium required to compensate him for the uncertainty in his expected
salary.
The principal is assumed to be risk neutral because she is well diversified. Her profit piP
is the difference between the firm value and the agent’s gross salary: piP ≡ x −W (x) =
(1− b)x− s. Hence, the principal’s expected profit is given by
E[piP ] ≡ (1− b)a− s.
The timing is as follows. In t = 0, the state sets a certain level for the bonus tax
τ ∈ (0, 1) that is levied on the agent’s bonus payment. In t = 1, the principal offers the
agent an employment contract with a fixed salary s and a bonus rate b. The agent accepts
this contract if it guarantees him at least his reservation utility, which is given by û. In
t = 2, after accepting the contract, the agent exerts effort a. In t = 3, the firm value x is
realized, and all the payments are made in t = 4.
2.3.2 Optimality Conditions and Equilibria
The agent maximizes his expected net utility E[UA] with respect to the effort level a so that
the maximization problem is given by
max
a≥0
{
E[UA] = s + (1− τ)ba−
rσ2ε
2
(1− τ)2b2 − c(a)
}
.
7In Subsection 2.3.3, we analyze the consequences of an endogenous outside option.
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The corresponding first-order condition is
∂E[UA]
∂a
= (1− τ)b− c′(a) = 0 (2.1)
and has a familiar interpretation. It states that the marginal benefit of effort must be equal
to the marginal costs of effort in equilibrium. For a cost function that satisfies Assumption
(A 2.1), the second-order condition for a maximum is fulfilled.
The principal maximizes her expected profit E[piP ] and solves
max
(s,b)≥0
{E[piP ] = (1− b)a− s}
subject to8
E[UA(a
∗)] = s + (1− τ)ba∗ −
rσ2ε
2
(1− τ)2b2 − c(a∗) > û,
a∗ ∈ argmax
a≥0
≥ E[UA].
The first constraint is the participation constraint (PC), which guarantees that the agent
receives at least his reservation utility û. The second constraint represents the incentive
compatibility constraint (IC) derived from the agent’s maximization problem. The principal
is able to control the agent’s effort a by choosing an appropriate bonus rate b. Therefore,
instead of replacing a, we use the IC and replace b with c′(a)/(1−τ) to set up the associated
Lagrangian LP . Then, the Lagrangian with multiplier λ is given by
LP (a, s, λ) ≡ a−
ac′(a)
1− τ
− s+ λ
(
s+ c′(a)a−
rσ2ε
2
c′(a)2 − c(a)− û
)
.
The corresponding first-order conditions are
∂LP
∂a
= 1−
c′(a∗)
1− τ
−
c′′(a∗)
1− τ
a∗ + λ
[
c′′(a∗)a∗ − c′(a∗)c′′(a∗)rσ2ε
]
= 0,
∂LP
∂s
= −1 + λ = 0,
∂LP
∂λ
= s+ c′(a∗)a∗ −
rσ2ε
2
c′(a∗)2 − c(a∗)− û = 0.
Note that the principal has an incentive to provide a compensation package so that the PC is
binding, i.e., the agent receives exactly his reservation utility û. Therefore, the derivative of
LP with respect to λ equals zero. With the above system, the agent’s optimality condition
c′(a∗) = (1 − τ)b∗ and λ = 1, we can rearrange the first-order condition of the principal
and obtain9
1 =
(
b∗ +
τ
1− τ
c′′(a∗)a∗
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
leakage effect
+ rσ2ε(1− τ)b
∗c′′(a∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸ .
risk effect
(2.2)
8We implicitely assume that, e.g., the outside option û and the bonus tax τ are sufficiently small so that
the principal obtains non-negative equilibrium profits.
9As shown in Appendix A.1, the second-order condition for a maximum is satisfied if c′′′(a∗) ≥ 0.
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Equation (2.2) has an intuitive interpretation. A one-unit increase in the agent’s effort (in-
duced by a higher bonus rate) produces one-to-one higher expected revenue yielding a
marginal revenue of one (lhs). The marginal revenue must be equal to the sum of the leak-
age effect (first term on rhs) and the risk effect (second term on rhs).10 The former effect
reflects the leakage in the contracting environment created through the bonus tax: the prin-
cipal incurs the full cost of the bonus payment, while the agent receives only fraction 1− τ
of it. Recall that the state keeps fraction τ of the bonus payment. The leakage effect makes
the use of bonuses more costly for the principal and is composed of two parts: (i) On the one
hand, higher effort generates higher costs for the principal, given by b∗+ c′′(a∗)a∗/(1− τ),
as she must pay the agent a higher bonus and incurs the full cost of the bonus payment.11
(ii) On the other hand, higher effort induces an income effect −c′′(a∗)a∗ for the agent so
that the PC is relaxed. This income effect takes into account that the agent receives only
fraction 1− τ of the bonus payment. Combining (i) and (ii) yields the leakage effect.
The risk effect indicates that higher effort implies higher uncertainty for the agent re-
garding his expected salary because the salary variance increases so that the PC is tightened.
It follows that the principal has to compensate the agent with a larger risk premium to ac-
cept the higher risk. It is important to mention that a higher degree of risk aversion of the
agent and/or a larger variance in the firm value strengthen the risk effect because the risk
premium increases. As we will see below, the risk effect plays a crucial role and may lead
to counter-intuitive results regarding the effect of a bonus tax.
The next proposition establishes the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium and
presents the optimality conditions deduced from the first-order conditions of the agent and
the principal.
Proposition 2.1.
(i) The equilibrium (b∗, s∗, a∗) exists and is unique.
(ii) The principal sets the optimal compensation package (b∗, s∗) as
b∗ =
(1− τ)− a∗c′′(a∗)τ
(1− τ) [1 + (1− τ)c′′(a∗)rσ2ε ]
and s∗ = û− c′(a∗)a∗ + c
′(a∗)2
2
rσ2ε + c(a
∗). (2.3)
(iii) The agent exerts optimal effort a∗ according to
c′(a∗) = (1− τ)b∗. (2.4)
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
According to Proposition 2.1, a unique equilibrium exists for a general cost function
that satisfies Assumption (A 2.1). The optimal bonus rate b∗, the optimal fixed salary s∗,
and the optimal effort level a∗ in equilibrium are defined implicitly by equations (2.3) and
(2.4). The proposition further shows that the bonus rate b∗ in equilibrium depends on the
agent’s degree of risk aversion r, the variance in the firm value σ2ε , the curvature of the
agent’s effort cost c′′(a∗), the bonus tax τ and the agent’s equilibrium effort a∗.
10We are grateful to an anonymous referee who pointed out the leakage effect.
11The first term represents the higher bonus paid by the principal, induced by a one-unit increase in the
agent’s effort and the second term reflects the effort-induced effect on the bonus rate.
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2.3.3 Effects of a Bonus Tax
In this section, we analyze how a bonus tax τ affects the agent’s effort level a∗, the bonus
rate b∗, and the fixed salary s∗ in equilibrium. For notational simplicity, henceforth the
parameter ρ stands for the product of the agent’s level of risk aversion r and the variance
in the firm value σ2ε , i.e., ρ ≡ rσ2ε . We refer to ρ as the “risk parameter” and establish the
following proposition:12
Proposition 2.2. A higher bonus tax τ has the following effects in equilibrium:
(i) The agent unambiguously reduces his effort, i.e., da∗
dτ
< 0.
(ii) The principal increases (decreases) the bonus rate b∗ if the risk parameter is larger
(lower) than ρb, i.e.,
db∗
dτ
R 0⇔ ρ R ρb ≡
c′′(a∗)(1− (1 + τ)b∗ + c′′(a∗)a∗)− τb∗c′′′(a∗)a∗
c′(a∗) [2c′′(a∗)2 + c′(a∗)c′′′(a∗)]
.
(iii) The principal decreases (increases) the fixed salary s∗ if the risk parameter is larger
(lower) than ρs, i.e.,
ds∗
dτ
⋚ 0⇔ ρ R ρs ≡
a∗
c′(a∗)
.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
To highlight the results from Proposition 2.2, we provide Example 2.1 and illustrate the
results in Figure 2.1.
Example 2.1. Suppose that c(a) = (φ/2)a2.13 We set φ = 1, û = 0.1 and restrict the range
of bonus taxes to the interval τ ∈ [0, 0.5] for which the principal’s profits are non-negative.
Note that the thresholds for the risk parameter in Proposition 2.2 are given by ρb = ρs = 1.
Figure 2.1 depicts the bonus rate in Panel A, the fixed salary in Panel B and the agent’s
effort in Panel C on the y-axis as functions of the bonus tax on the x-axis for different risk
parameters ρ.14 We choose ρ ∈ {0.8, 1, 1.2} to highlight the different cases in Proposition
2.2. Panel A shows that a higher bonus tax increases (decreases) the bonus rate if the risk
parameter is larger (lower) than 1. The opposite is true with respect to the fixed salary
(Panel B). If the risk parameter is equal to 1, then a bonus tax has neither an effect on the
fixed salary nor on the bonus rate. Panel C shows that the agent’s effort unambiguously
decreases with a higher bonus tax.
12Note that in the case of an endogenously-determined outside option û(τ), which negatively depends on
τ , the results of Proposition 2.2 remain unchanged except for the effect of a bonus tax on the fixed salary s∗.
In this case, only the condition in part (iii) changes to ds∗
dτ
= dû(τ)
dτ
+ da
∗
dτ
c′′(a∗) [ρc′(a∗)− a∗] R 0.
13Note that this function satisfies Assumption (A 2.1) and has well-defined properties that allow us to
calculate the equilibrium values (a∗, b∗, s∗) in closed form.
14Panel D depicts the agent’s net-of-tax salary, which will be discussed below.
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Figure 2.1: Bonus Tax Effects for Quadratic Cost Functions
Now, we return to the case of a general cost function and provide the intuition for the
results of Proposition 2.2. According to part (i), the agent unambiguously reduces effort as
a reaction to a higher bonus tax. Recall from the optimality condition that the agent chooses
effort so that the marginal effort costs equal the marginal benefit of effort in equilibrium,
i.e., c′(a∗) = (1 − τ)b∗. The direct tax effect (1 − τ) has a negative effect on the marginal
benefit of effort (rhs). Based on part (ii) of Proposition 2.2, we know that b∗ decreases in τ
if ρ < ρb, which further reduces the marginal benefit. It follows that the marginal benefit
unambiguously decreases if the bonus tax increases. In this case, it is clear that the agent
reduces his effort in equilibrium. If ρ > ρb, then the bonus rate b∗ increases through a higher
bonus tax, which results in a positive effect on the marginal benefit of effort. However, the
direct tax effect always overcompensates for a higher b∗ so that the marginal benefit still
decreases. Also in this case, the agent will reduce his effort in equilibrium.
Parts (ii) and (iii) show that, contrary to its intention, a bonus tax can induce the principal
to set a higher bonus rate and a lower fixed salary. Particularly, the reaction of the principal
to a higher bonus tax crucially depends on the variance in the firm value and how risk averse
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the agent is. If the corresponding risk parameter is sufficiently large (i.e., ρ > ρb), then a
higher bonus tax leads to a higher bonus rate and thus increases the incentive power of the
contract. Yet, if ρ is larger than another threshold (i.e., ρ > ρs), then a higher bonus tax
leads to a lower fixed salary.15
The intuition for the effect on the bonus rate is as follows. From the principal’s first-
order condition in equation (2.2), we deduce that a higher bonus tax does not influence
the principal’s marginal revenue; the marginal revenue of effort is constant and equals one
(lhs). However, a bonus tax influences the leakage and risk effects (rhs). On the one hand, a
higher bonus tax strengthens the leakage effect because the agent receives a lower fraction
of the bonus paid by the principal. As a consequence, the principal has incentives to reduce
the bonus rate. On the other hand, a higher bonus tax decreases the risk premium required
to compensate the agent for the uncertainty in his expected salary due to a lower salary
variance. It follows that the principal has incentives to increase the bonus rate. Hence, the
leakage effect induces the principal to decrease the bonus rate, while the risk effect provides
incentives to increase the bonus rate. Whether the bonus rate increases or decreases through
the introduction of a bonus tax depends on the relative size of these two effects. Because a
higher risk parameter ρ has no direct influence on the leakage effect but it increases the risk
premium and therefore strengthens the risk effect, the risk effect will dominate the leakage
effect if ρ is sufficiently large (i.e., ρ > ρb). In this case a higher bonus tax induces the
principal to increase the bonus rate b∗. If, however, ρ < ρb, then the principal decreases
the bonus rate b∗ through a higher bonus tax because the leakage effect dominates the risk
effect. If ρ = ρb, then the leakage and risk effects balance each other out so that b∗ is not
affected by a change in the bonus tax.
In a next step, we provide the intuition for the principal’s behavior with respect to the
fixed salary s∗. The partial derivative of s∗ with respect to τ is given by
ds∗
dτ
= [c′′(a∗)a∗︸ ︷︷ ︸−
income effect
ρ(1− τ)b∗c′′(a∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
risk effect
]
(
−
da∗
dτ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
.
From the discussion regarding equation (2.2), we know that the income effect relaxes and
the risk effect tightens the PC. We derive the following effects of a higher bonus tax. On
the one hand, a higher tax diminishes the income effect because the agent receives a lower
fraction of the bonus payment, and hence, the principal must increase the fixed salary to
satisfy the PC. On the other hand, a higher tax lowers the salary variance in the agent’s
salary yielding a lower risk premium. In this case, the principal can decrease the fixed
salary to satisfy the PC. Similar to above, the risk parameter influences the magnitude of
the risk effect and therefore determines how bonus taxes affect the fixed salary. If ρ > ρs,
then the risk effect dominates the income effect so that the principal has an incentive to
decrease the fixed salary in equilibrium: that is, ds∗
dτ
< 0. The opposite holds true if ρ < ρs.
In this case, the income effect dominates the risk effect and the principal increases the fixed
15It should be noted that the bonus rate b∗ and the fixed salary s∗ depend on the risk parameter so that the
threshold values ρb and ρs themselves depend on ρ.
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salary: that is, ds∗
dτ
> 0. Note that if ρ = ρs, then both effects are equally strong and s∗ is
not affected by a change in τ .
Based on parts (ii) and (iii) of Proposition 2.2, we can derive the following corollary:
Corollary 2.1. The introduction of a bonus tax does not necessarily imply a substitution
effect between the fixed salary s∗ and the bonus rate b∗.
Basic intuition might suggest that a bonus tax induces a substitution between the fixed
salary and the bonus rate. However, such a substitution effect is not guaranteed because
the threshold values ρs and ρb are not necessarily equal for a general cost function. For
example, a higher bonus tax can induce a simultaneous increase in the fixed salary and the
bonus rate. Such a pattern can occur, e.g., in the case of a cubic cost function.16 However,
for a quadratic cost function, the threshold values ρs and ρb are equal. In this case, a
substitution effect is present between s∗ and b∗, i.e., whenever a tax change induces the
principal to increase the bonus rate, she will lower the fixed salary and vice versa.
In the next proposition, we analyze how a bonus tax affects the expected bonus payment
and the expected salary in the case of a quadratic effort cost function c(a) = (φ/2)a2.
Proposition 2.3. For a quadratic cost function, a higher bonus tax τ has the following
effects in equilibrium:
(i) The expected bonus payment b∗a∗ given by the principal increases until the maximum
is reached for a bonus tax given by τ ′ ≡ ρφ−3
ρφ−1
if ρ ∈ ( 3
φ
, 5−τ
φ(1−τ)
). However, the agent
unambiguously receives a lower expected bonus payment (1− τ)b∗a∗.
(ii) The expected gross salary s∗ + b∗a∗ paid by the principal and the expected net-of-tax
salary s∗ + (1− τ)b∗a∗ received by the agent unambiguously decrease.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
Part (i) of the proposition posits that the bonus paid by the principal can increase if
these payments are taxed. This surprising result emerges if the risk parameter is sufficiently
large (i.e., ρ > 3/φ). Recall that the agent always reduces effort a∗ with a higher bonus
tax and that the principal’s reaction depends on ρ.17 It is clear that the bonus payment
cannot increase if ρ < 1/φ, because then, the principal also decreases the bonus rate b∗.
Hence, a necessary condition to obtain an increase in the bonus payment with a higher tax
rate is ρ > 1/φ. According to Proposition 2.3, the threshold value of the risk parameter
above which the bonus payment increases with the introduction of a bonus tax is given by
ρ = 3/φ. That is, only if ρ > 3/φ will the increase in the bonus rate compensate for the
decrease in the agent’s effort level. In this case, the bonus payment increases with a higher
tax until the maximum is reached for τ = τ ′. Raising the bonus tax above τ ′ decreases the
bonus payment so that it can be even lower than in the benchmark case without a tax. As the
state keeps τb∗a∗, the agent only receives (1−τ)b∗a∗, which is always lower than without a
tax. That is, the tax-induced decrease in (1−τ) always compensates for a potential increase
in the bonus payment.
16Detailed simulation results for different cost functions are available upon request.
17Note that the thresholds ρs and ρb are given by ρs = ρb = 1/φ for c(a) = (φ/2)a2.
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Part (ii) examines how a bonus tax affects the agent’s salary.18 We find that a bonus tax
unambiguously induces a decrease in the gross salary, and consequently, also in the net-of-
tax salary. Hence, a bonus tax is an effective policy instrument in reducing the agent’s (gross
and net-of-tax) salary. The intuition regarding the effect on the gross salary is as follows.
If ρ < 1/φ, then the increase in the fixed salary s∗ cannot compensate for the decrease in
the bonus payment b∗a∗. If ρ ∈ (1/φ, 3/φ) both the fixed salary and the bonus payment
decrease and if ρ > 3/φ, then the decrease in the fixed salary outweighs the increase in
the bonus payment so that the agent’s gross salary unambiguously decreases independent
of the risk parameter. It immediately follows that also the net-of-tax salary decreases. See
Panel D of Figure 2.1, which depicts the agent’s net-of-tax salary (y-axis) as a function of
the bonus tax (x-axis) for different risk parameters.
It should be noted that the risk parameter influences how strong the salary decreases
with a higher bonus tax. For example, a lower degree of risk aversion on the part of the
agent and/or a lower variance in the firm value engender a stronger decrease in the agent’s
gross salary.
2.4 Conclusion
This essay has investigated the consequences of taxing the agent’s bonus in a principal-
agent model. A bonus tax has different effects on the fixed salary and the bonus rate because
the principal sets an optimal compensation package on the conditions that the agent reaches
at least his reservation utility and the package is incentive compatible. To determine the
composition of the package, the principal anticipates that a higher bonus tax will increase
the leakage in the contracting environment because the principal incurs the full cost of the
bonus payment, while the agent receives only a fraction of it. This leakage effect makes the
use of bonuses more costly for the principal. However, a higher bonus tax decreases the risk
premium required to compensate the agent for the uncertainty in his expected salary due to
a lower salary variance. This risk effect provides the principal with incentives to increase
the bonus rate. Whether the bonus rate increases or decreases through the introduction of
bonus taxes depends on the relative size of these two effects. Our model further shows that
a bonus tax does not necessarily induce the principal to substitute variable salary with fixed
salary for a general effort cost function. In particular, it is possible that a higher bonus tax
simultaneously increases the fixed salary component and the bonus rate.
Moreover, we derive that the agent unambiguously reacts to a higher bonus tax with
lower effort. For quadratic effort costs, despite a tax-induced effort reduction, a higher
bonus tax induces the principal to pay higher bonuses if the agent is sufficiently risk averse
and/or the variance in the firm value is sufficiently large. In this case, the increase in the
bonus rate overcompensates for the decrease in the agent’s effort. Therefore, it is not guar-
anteed that firms will have to pay lower bonuses after implementing a bonus tax. Never-
theless, a bonus tax reduces the overall salary of the agent so that a bonus tax proves to be
an effective policy instrument in reducing the agent’s salary. Hereby, the reduction of the
18We are grateful to an anonymous referee who suggested to analyze the overall salary.
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agent’s salary is more pronounced the lower the risk parameter.
To sum up, a bonus tax influences both the overall size and the structure of the agent’s
salary. For example, if the agent is highly risk averse, then the reduction in the agent’s
gross salary induced by a bonus tax is relatively small and, in addition, the principal shifts
the compensation package from the fixed salary to the variable salary. However, if the agent
is not too risk averse, then a bonus tax induces a relatively large reduction in the gross salary
and also shifts the compensation package towards the fixed salary.
Our model yields potentially testable comparative-static results. In particular, our model
might help to predict the sectors and firms in which bonuses would decrease or increase. In
uncertain economic environments and/or in firms, in which the monitoring and evaluation
of the manager’s performance is comparatively hard, we expect that bonus taxes will induce
a firm to pay higher bonuses. Additionally, we do not expect bonus tax to have the effect of
shifting the bonus rate towards a fixed salary. That is, we anticipate low fixed salaries and
high bonus rates. Moreover, our model predicts that the overall salary will only experience
a relatively small reduction. We can derive the following examples of firms for these pre-
dictions: (i) New-economy firms: These firms tend to operate in more uncertain economic
environments than old-economy firms. In addition, it might be more difficult to observe the
manager’s marginal contribution in new-economy firms because these firms grow faster,
are more R&D intensive and have larger market-to-book ratios than old-economy firms
(see Ittner, Lambert, and Larcker, 2003) (ii) Large firms: According to Schaefer (1998),
large firms have more noisy measures of individual performance than small firms. More-
over, in large firms, one manager’s action has less influence on the firm value than it might
have in small firms. (iii) Privately held firms: Marino and Za´bojnı´k (2008) suggest that it
is harder for privately held firms to evaluate their managers because a public firm’s stock
price provides an informative measure of performance which is less available in privately
held firms.
Our simple model may serve as a basic framework to further analyze bonus taxes in a
principal-agent model. There is a broad range of further applications and model extensions.
For instance, an interesting avenue for further research could be the extension of our model
to more than one period. An agent’s effort decisions are often connected over time, and
working contracts extend over several time periods. The implementation of these dynamics
in the model could shed more light on the impact of bonus taxes on executive pay. Further-
more, an interesting extension would be to analyze the effects of bonus taxes on executives’
risk-taking behavior or welfare implications of bonus taxes.
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Appendix A
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2.1
First, we compute the condition under which the principal’s second-order condition is sat-
isfied. The first-order condition of the principal can be written as
1− γ∗ −
c′′(a∗)
1 − τ
a∗ + c′′(a∗)a∗ − (1− τ)γ∗c′′(a∗)rσ2ε = 0.
To ensure that the second-order condition for a maximum is satisfied, a lower bound of the
third-order derivative of the cost function is required at a∗, i.e.,
c′′′(a∗) ≥ Ψ∗ ≡ −c′′(a∗)
1 + τ + (1− τ)c′′(a∗)rσ2ε
a∗τ + (1− τ)c′(a∗)rσ2ε
.
This inequality is satisfied because we assumed that c′′′(a) ≥ 0 for a ≥ 0.
Second, we derive the optimality conditions. By solving equation (2.2), we obtain the
optimal bonus rate b∗ as
b∗ =
(1− τ)− a∗c′′(a∗)τ
(1− τ) [1 + (1− τ)c′′(a∗)rσ2ε ]
. (A.5)
With the binding PC, we calculate the optimal fixed salary s∗ as
s∗ = û− c′(a∗)a∗ +
c′(a∗)2
2
rσ2ε + c(a
∗). (A.6)
From (2.1), it is straightforward to derive the agent’s optimality condition c′(a∗) = (1−τ)b∗.
Third, we show that the equilibrium (b∗, s∗, a∗) exists and is unique. By combining the
two optimality conditions
c′(a) = (1− τ)b and b = (1− τ)− ac
′′(a)τ
(1− τ) [1 + (1− τ)c′′(a)rσ2ε ]
,
we obtain
1− τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡κlhs
= c′(a) + c′′(a)(aτ + (1− τ)rσ2εc
′(a))︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡κrhs(a)
. (A.7)
The left-hand side κlhs of equation (A.7) is independent of a and the right-hand side κrhs(a)
is a continuous function in a because the cost function satisfies Assumption (A 2.1). (i) For
a = 0, we obtain κlhs = 1− τ > 0 = κrhs(0). (ii) For a > 0, we derive
∂κrhs(a)
∂a
> 0⇔ c′′′(a) > Ψ(a) = −c′′(a)
1 + τ + (1− τ)c′′(a)rσ2ε
aτ + (1− τ)c′(a)rσ2ε
.
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Because Ψ(a) < 0 for a > 0 and according to Assumption (A 2.1), c′′′(a) ≥ 0, we
conclude that ∂κrhs(a)
∂a
> 0. Thus, κrhs(a) is a monotonically increasing function in a. Com-
bining (i) and (ii) and using the assumption lim
a→∞
c′(a) = ∞, it is guaranteed that κrhs(a)
passes the constant κlhs for a certain effort a = a∗ > 0. Hence, there exist exactly one
intersection, which defines the unique equilibrium a∗. Plugging a∗ into equations (A.5) and
(A.6) yields the other equilibrium values (b∗, s∗).
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2.2
To prove Parts (i) and (ii), we use the optimality conditions
c′(a∗) = (1− τ)b∗ and b∗ = (1− τ)− a
∗c′′(a∗)τ
(1− τ) [1 + (1− τ)c′′(a∗)ρ]
,
rearrange them and obtain
g1(a
∗, b∗, τ) := c′(a∗)− (1− τ)b∗ = 0,
g2(a
∗, b∗, τ) := (1− τ)− a∗c′′(a∗)τ − (1− τ)b∗ [1 + (1− τ)c′′(a∗)ρ] = 0.
Next, we derive the total differential of g1(a∗, b∗, τ) = 0 and g2(a∗, b∗, τ) = 0:
∂g1
∂a∗
da∗ +
∂g1
∂b∗
db∗ +
∂g1
∂τ
dτ = 0,
∂g2
∂a∗
da∗ +
∂g2
∂b∗
db∗ +
∂g2
∂τ
dτ = 0.
The total differential can also be written as[
g1a g1b
g2a g2b
] [
da∗
db∗
]
=
[
−g1τ
−g2τ
]
dτ, (A.8)
where
g1a =
∂g1
∂a∗
= c′′(a∗), g1b =
∂g1
∂b∗
= −(1− τ), g1τ =
∂g1
∂τ
= b∗,
g2a =
∂g2
∂a∗
= −
[
τc′′(a∗) + c′′′(a∗)(a∗τ + (1− τ)2b∗ρ)
]
,
g2b =
∂g2
∂b∗
= −(1 − τ) [1 + ρ(1− τ)c′′(a∗)] ,
g2τ =
∂g2
∂τ
= b∗ − 1− c′′(a∗) [a∗ − 2b∗ρ(1− τ)] .
(A.9)
Applying Cramer’s Rule to (A.8), we derive
da∗
dτ
=
g1bg2τ − g2bg1τ
g1ag2b − g1bg2a
and db
∗
dτ
=
g2ag1τ − g1ag2τ
g1ag2b − g1bg2a
. (A.10)
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Plugging (A.9) into (A.10), we obtain
da∗
dτ
=
c′′(a∗) [(1− τ)b∗ρ− a∗]− 1
ζ
,
db∗
dτ
=
b∗(a∗τ + ρ(1− τ)2b∗)c′′′(a∗)− c′′(a∗) [1− (1 + τ)b∗ + (a∗ − 2ρ(1− τ)b∗)c′′(a∗)]
(1− τ)ζ
,
with ζ ≡ c′′(a∗) [1 + τ + (1− τ)c′′(a∗)ρ] + c′′′(a∗) [a∗τ + (1− τ)2b∗ρ]. It follows that
db∗
dτ
= 0⇔ ρ = ρb ≡
c′′(a∗)(1− (1 + τ)b∗ + c′′(a∗)a∗)− τb∗c′′′(a∗)a∗
c′(a∗) [2c′′(a∗)2 + c′(a∗)c′′′(a∗)]
.
It is straightforward to show that d(db
∗/dτ)
dρ
> 0, i.e., db∗
dτ
is a monotonically increasing func-
tion in ρ. It follows that db∗
dτ
R 0⇔ ρ R ρb, which proves Part (ii) of the proposition.
Regarding the agent’s optimal effort a∗, with c′′′(a∗) ≥ 0,
da∗
dτ
R 0⇔ ρ R ρa ≡
1 + c′′(a∗)a∗
c′(a∗)c′′(a∗)
.
At first glance, given that the risk parameter is sufficiently large, i.e., ρ > ρa, it is possible
that the agent exerts more effort in equilibrium if the bonus tax increases. However, we
will provide a proof by contradiction to show that the agent always reduces his effort with
a higher bonus tax. Suppose that da∗
dτ
≥ 0. This assumption directly implies that db∗
dτ
> 0
because c′(a∗) = (1 − τ)b∗.19 By using the PC and the IC, we rearrange the principal’s
first-order condition and obtain20
1− b∗ = c′′(a∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
not dec. in τ
[
ρ c′(a∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
not dec. in τ
+ a∗︸︷︷︸
not dec. in τ
τ
(1− τ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
inc. in τ
]
. (A.11)
Under the assumption da∗
dτ
≥ 0, the rhs of equation (A.11) increases with a higher bonus tax
τ . It follows that b∗ on the lhs, which is by definition in the interval (0, 1), must decrease
(i.e., db∗
dτ
< 0) to guarantee also an increase of the lhs. This result, however, contradicts the
assumption da∗
dτ
≥ 0, which implies db∗
dτ
> 0. Hence, our assumption was wrong and it must
be the case that da∗
dτ
< 0. This proves Part (i) of the proposition.
Proof of part (iii). Based on the optimality condition regarding the fixed salary s∗ =
û− c′(a∗)a∗+ c
′(a∗)2
2
ρ+ c(a∗), we compute ds∗
dτ
= da
∗
dτ
c′′(a∗) (ρc′(a∗)− a∗) . With da∗
dτ
< 0,
we conclude ds∗
dτ
⋚ 0 ⇔ ρ R ρs ≡ a
∗
c′(a∗)
. This proves Part (iii) and completes the proof of
the proposition.
19A higher bonus tax decreases the rhs of this equation and a necessary condition to guarantee an increase
of the lhs is db
∗
dτ
> 0.
20See also the discussion after Proposition 2.2.
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A.3 Proof of Proposition 2.3
For a quadratic cost function c(a) = (φ/2)a2, we compute the optimal compensation pack-
age (b∗, s∗) and effort a∗ as
(b∗, s∗) =
(
1
1 + τ + ρφ(1− τ)
, û−
(1− ρφ)(1− τ)2
2φ [1 + τ + ρφ(1− τ)]2
)
, a∗ =
1− τ
φ [1 + τ + ρφ(1− τ)]
.
Proof of part (i). The partial derivative of the expected bonus b∗a∗ (paid by the principal)
with respect to τ is given by
∂(b∗a∗)
∂τ
=
τ − 3 + φρ(1− τ)
φ [1 + τ + φρ(1− τ)]3
= 0⇔ τ = τ ′ ≡
ρφ− 3
ρφ− 1
.
If ρ < 1/φ, then b∗a∗ is a convex function in τ and has a minimum at τ = τ ′. If ρ ∈
( 1
φ
, 5−τ
φ(1−τ)
), then b∗a∗ is a concave function in τ and has a maximum at τ = τ ′. Moreover,
we derive that for ρ ∈ (1/φ, 3/φ), the threshold τ ′ is negative and for ρ < 1/φ or ρ > 3/φ,
τ ′ is positive. It follows that ρ has to be in the interval ( 3
φ
, 5−τ
φ(1−τ)
) to guarantee that the
bonus paid by the principal increases with a higher bonus tax until the maximum is reached
for τ = τ ′. Moreover, the partial derivative of the expected bonus (1− τ)b∗a∗ (received by
the agent) with respect to τ is given by
∂ ((1− τ) b∗a∗)
∂τ
= −
4(1− τ)
φ [1 + τ + ρφ(1− τ)]3
< 0.
Hence, the bonus received by the agent always decreases with a higher bonus tax.
Proof of part (ii). To show that the expected gross salary s∗ + b∗a∗ and the net-of-tax
salary s∗ + (1− τ)b∗a∗ decrease in τ , we compute
∂ (s∗ + b∗a∗)
∂τ
= −
1
φ [1 + τ + ρφ(1− τ)]2
< 0,
∂ (s∗ + (1− τ)b∗a∗)
∂τ
= −
2(1 + ρφ)(1− τ)
φ [1 + τ + ρφ(1− τ)]3
< 0,
which proves the claim. Moreover, ∂
2(s∗+b∗a∗)
∂τ∂ρ
= 2(1−τ)
[1+τ+ρφ(1−τ)]3
> 0, which shows that the
decrease in the gross salary is stronger the lower the risk parameter ρ.
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3Technology and Market Structure in the Defender
Model∗
joint with Helmut M. Dietl and Christian Jaag
Abstract
This essay studies a more specific version of the defender model by explicitly modeling the
cost associated with product attributes. Two firms compete in three dimensions: two quality
attributes which impact fixed and variable costs and product pricing. We then derive the
optimal market defense for various market and cost structures and apply these findings to
the liberalized postal sector and to the telecommunications industry. Drawing insight from
these two applications, we explain observed investment behaviors of firms in these markets.
In the telecommunications industry, we establish a consistent theoretical explanation for the
empirical evidence about the regulation/investment trade-off shown by Grajek and Ro¨ller
(2012) and Briglauer, Ecker, and Gugler (2012).
3.1 Introduction
This essay studies a more specific version of the defender model pioneered by Hauser and
Shugan (1983). Therefore, we explicitly modeling a firm’s cost structure associated with
product attributes. Market positioning of products has long been an intensely discussed
topic in the economics and marketing literature. Until the early 80s, the literature mainly
confronted the issue of optimal new brand positioning. Existing brands thus got an indicator
∗This essay has been submitted to the Journal of Regulatory Economics.
43
44 3. Technology and Market Structure in the Defender Model
of how a new brand might attack. The reverse question of how to optimally defend its mar-
ket share and profit against an attack remained unanswered until Hauser and Shugan (1983).
In their original paper “Defensive Marketing Strategies”, Hauser and Shugan introduced a
model that went beyond the traditional analysis of offensive new-brand positioning by fo-
cusing on the defending rather than on the attacking brand (defender model). One of their
basic observations was that in most markets incumbents react to competition by lowering
prices. In some industries, however, established firms defend their profits against market
entrants by increasing product prices. Hauser and Shugan (1983) explain these differences
by heterogeneity in consumer tastes. Another key assumption of their model is the ’per-
dollar’ measure of product utility. Instead of integrating prices as a separate dimension in a
traditional perceptual map (e.g., Urban and Hauser, 1980; Hauser and Gaskin, 1984), they
interpret each quality dimension in relation to the product’s price (cf. Hauser and Simmie,
1981).
The defender model develops qualitative normative implications that instruct how es-
tablished firms should defend their profits when facing an attack by a new competitive
product. Hauser and Shugan (1983) did not limit the scope of strategic instruments to the
dimension of price. They allowed incumbents to react by adjusting distribution and aware-
ness advertising expenditures, budgets for repositioning advertising, and product quality
improvements. The main recommendations were that prices should be decreased in non-
segmented markets and potentially increased in highly-segmented markets; distribution and
awareness advertising expenditures should be decreased while budgets for repositioning ad-
vertising and product improvement away from the strengths of the new products should be
increased.
The model and its results have since been verified empirically for several industries,
such as food, software and pharmaceuticals (cf. Hauser and Gaskin, 1984; Kuester et al.,
2001). While the defender model predicts the optimal direction of response, later empirical
studies examined further aspects of defensive actions, such as the reaction speed and the
intensity of reactions. MacMillan, McCaffery, and Van Wijk (1985) find that reaction speed
increases in the threat posed by the attacker and decreases with the size of the defending
brand.1 A high reaction speed has been observed in markets with high growth rates and low
switching costs, as seen in Bowmann and Gatignon (1995).
Other studies focus on the intensity of the defending brand’s reactions. These studies
find that the intensity of reactions increases in the threat posed by the attacker and in mar-
ket size and growth (cf. Heil and Walters, 1993; Shankar, 1999). The incumbent’s market
dominance and the extent of the attacker’s investments have been identified as being neg-
atively correlated to reaction intensity (e.g., Kalra, Rajiv, and Srinivasan, 1998). Kuester
et al. (2001) summarize the most relevant studies in the field of defensive strategies: re-
action speed and intensity are highest in highly concentrated and growing markets, while
size and innovation capabilities of the attacking firm have negative effects on the defend-
ing firm’s reaction intensity. The empirical significance of the model is demonstrated by
1In some industries, a delayed reaction could also be explained by signaling motives (cf. Kalra, Rajiv, and
Srinivasan, 1998)
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Hauser and Gaskin (1984) and Shugan (1987) who apply the defender model to different
markets. Shugan (1987, p. 14) concludes that the model fits well and provides potentially
useful information and Hauser and Gaskin (1984, p. 347) posit that the defender model is
an adequate representation of aggregate consumer response. Nevertheless, the success of
each application highly depends on the choice of attributes (cf. Hauser and Shugan, 2008).
The original defender model is confined by the assumption that quality attributes are
strict substitutes: they do not cause specific costs but are restricted to add up to a constant
amount. The contribution of this essay is to give the original defender model more structure
by explicitly modeling the cost associated with quality attributes. This allows us to derive
optimal defending strategies depending on an industry specific market and cost structure.
Furthermore, the derived model can be applied to the postal sector and the telecommunica-
tions industry.
For many years, the postal sector has relied on a reserved area (monopoly) to finance
universal services obligations. Recently, first liberalization steps took place and competi-
tion started to emerge. The defender model suggests strategies for the incumbents and the
entrants. It also instructs that policy makers must be aware of the market forces when lib-
eralizing this sector. In order to ensure that people in rural and less populated areas will be
served, the government must provide benefits to attract firms there.
In the telecommunications industry, our model explains why regulated network access
might undermine investment incentives. To the best of our knowledge, our research is
unique in addressing these questions through application of the defender model. Empir-
ically, Grajek and Ro¨ller (2012) consider the inherent regulation/investment trade-off be-
tween access regulation and investment incentives with a data set that covers more than 70
fixed-line operators in 20 countries over 10 years. Briglauer, Ecker, and Gugler (2012) ex-
tract the determinants of Next Generation Access (NGA) deployment with data from the 27
European Union member states for the years 2005 to 2010. While these two articles provide
empirical evidence of this trade-off, the defender model allows to prove it theoretically.2
This essay is arranged as follows. Section 3.2 describes the defender model with its
main assumptions and notations. Section 3.3 summarizes the results. Section 3.4 high-
lights the results in the context of postal liberalization and regulated network access in the
telecommunications industry. Section 3.5 discusses the main insights and conclusions.
3.2 Model
The model is based on the paper by Hauser and Shugan (1983). Products differ in re-
gard to quality attributes and prices, respectively. They induce variable and fixed costs.
Firms compete by choosing the product’s quality attributes and by setting its price. The
resulting position determines the firm’s market shares. Let Vi and Fi be the two quantities
of the product’s quality attributes provided by firm i. The two quality attributes differ in
their cost structure: Vi imposes variable and Fi imposes fixed costs. Pi is the price of the
2The two companion papers by Valletti and Cambini (2005) and by Cambini and Valletti (2003) provide
insight into the change in investment incentives based on networks with different levels of quality.
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products. Then, Ωi ≡ {Vi, Fi, Pi} is the product attributes’ bundle offered by firm i and
pii(mi(Ωi,Ωj),Ωi,Ωj) its profit. mi(Ωi,Ωj) denotes firm i’s market share which is based
on firm i’s and firm j’s position.
We are interested in firm i’s reactions to changes in firm j’s product attributes. In
order to evaluate firm i’s optimal reactions x ∈ Ωi due to an attack by firm j’s attribute
y ∈ Ωj, we calculate the first order conditions and derive the optimal values Ω∗i (Ωj) ≡
{V ∗i (Ωj), F
∗
i (Ωj), P
∗
i (Ωj)}.
Next, we establish the reaction functions based on the total derivatives of the first order
conditions ∂pii/∂x = 0:
dx
dy
= −
∂2pii(.)
∂x∂y
∂2pii(.)
∂x2
, (3.1)
where x ∈ Ω∗
i
(Ωj) and y ∈ Ωj . The second order derivatives ∂2pii/∂x2 have to be negative
in order to accomplish a profit maximum at the corresponding positions. Therefore, the
nominator in equation (3.1) defines the sign of dx/dy. We summarize this insight in the
first lemma.
Lemma 3.1. Firm i’s reactions x ∈ Ω∗
i
(Ωj) to changes in firm j’s attributes y ∈ Ωj are
given by the signs of the mixed second order derivatives.
sgn
[
dx
dy
]
= sgn
[
∂2pii(.)
∂x∂y
]
Proof. Based on equation (3.1), the claim follows immediately.
So far, we have introduced a general framework to tackle the research question. We
must further specify the reduced-form profit function to establish more advanced results.
Then, firm i’s optimal reactions to attacks by firm j can be calculated and discussed. How-
ever, the assessment of the model requires more specifications. We use the definitions and
assumptions from Hauser and Shugan (1983, pp. 321), namely representation by product
position, utility maximization and linearity. Hence, the consumer model introduced below
follows the main assumptions in the original defender model. Every customer in the market
maximizes his or her utility u. Let ui be the utility which a randomly selected customer
places on the purchase of one unit of brand i. Each brand i’s position is defined by the
amount of attribute 1 obtainable from one unit Vi of brand i, and the amount of attribute 2
obtainable from one unit Fi of brand i. The utility a customer places on one unit of brand
i is noted as u˜i, which is a random variable to reflect customer heterogeneity. In a market
with more than one brand available, the customer decides to purchase the brand closest to
his or her preferences. The probability that a randomly chosen customer chooses brand i is
denoted as mi. It is defined as
mi(u˜i, u˜j) ≡ Prob[u˜i > u˜j, ∀i 6= j],
where Prob[.] denotes a probability function. To compute customer preferences, we follow
the original defender model by defining w˜k as the weight a customer places on attribute k.
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We refine the definition of mi as
mi(Ωi,Ωj) ≡ Prob
[
w˜1Vi + w˜2Fi
Pi
>
w˜1Vj + w˜2Fj
Pj
]
or, after straightforward algebraic manipulations,
mi(Ωi,Ωj) ≡ Prob
[(
Vi
Pi
−
Vj
Pj
)
>
w˜2
w˜1
(
Fj
Pj
−
Fi
Pi
)]
.
Hence, in a two-attribute space, the preferences of each customer can be represented by an
indifference curve with angle w˜2/w˜1. The slope of the ray from the origin that intersects
the indifference curve orthogonally is thus defined as α˜ ≡ tan−1 (w˜2/w˜1). Figure 3.1
geometrically illustrates a randomly chosen customer’s preferences. Any customer will
favor the brand that maximizes his or her utility. For the sake of simplicity, we assume
customer preferences to be uniformly distributed.
V/P
pi
2
α˜ ≡ tan−1(w˜2/w˜1)
i
j
F/P0
indifference curve
Figure 3.1: Geometric illustration of a randomly chosen customer’s preferences
In the initial market equilibrium are two firms offering brand i and brand j. Each brand’s
position in the two-attribute space is defined by its perceived attribute levels (V, F ) and its
unit price P . Given the first brand’s position, the other firm will set its price adjusted quality
attributes on the top left or bottom right, which correspond to one of the shaded areas in
Figure 3.2. Hence, there is a restriction on the second brand’s positioning,(
Vi
Pi
−
Vj
Pj
)(
Fi
Pi
−
Fj
Pj
)
≤ 0 (3.2)
which implies that each of the two firms’ products has a “strong” and a “weak” quality
dimension.
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V/P
pi
2
tan−1
(
w˜2
w˜1
)
i
j
Vj/Pj
Vi/Pi
Fi/Pi Fj/Pj F/P0
z
indifference curve
Figure 3.2: Positioning and Market Shares
Figure 3.2 illustrates a situation in which brand i is positioned in point i and brand j
is positioned in point j. The straight line with slope r = −(Vi/Pi − Vj/Pj)/(Fj/Pj −
Fi/Pi) = −iz/jz thus represents the indifference curve of the customer that is precisely
indifferent between brands i and j. All customers with a steeper indifference curve than the
one shown will choose brand j those with a flatter indifference curve will choose brand i.
Since we assume customer preferences to be uniformly distributed, the ray from the origin
that orthogonally intersects this indifference curve now segregates the market in the shares
obtained by brands i and j. Firm i’s market share3 is thus given as
mi(Ωi,Ωj) =

2
pi
arctan
(
Vi
Pi
−
Vj
Pj
Fj
Pj
−
Fi
Pi
)
if Vi
Pi
−
Vj
Pj
> 0
1− 2
pi
arctan
(
Vi
Pi
−
Vj
Pj
Fj
Pj
−
Fi
Pi
)
if Vi
Pi
−
Vj
Pj
≤ 0.
Total market size is assumed to be constant and equal to one. Hence, firm i’s total sales
volume is given as mi.
Three conditions that must be satisfied to apply our model. First, the attributes must be
relevant in that they affect the buying decisions of customers. Second, they are substitutive
in nature.4 This ensures that (a) no brand can have high characteristics in all attributes at
the same time and (b) each brand has to be positioned efficiently (shaded area in Figure
3.2) because no customer will chose a brand that is inferior to another in all price adjusted
attributes. Third, the attributes have to be measurable.
The production of a certain level of quality entails cost. We assume costs to be convex
in quality and denote C1(mi, Vi) as variable cost and C2(Fi) as fixed (volume independent)
3Note, the market share mj can be computed as mj = 1−mi.
4Hauser and Shugan (1983) chose the attributes efficacy and mildness for liquid dish washing detergents.
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cost. Thus, firm i’s profit is given as
pii(Ωi,Ωj) = R
(
mi(Ωi,Ωj), Pi
)
− C1
(
mi(Ωi,Ωj), Vi
)
− C2(Fi)
= mi(Ωi,Ωj)
(
Pi − gV
d
i
)
− fF bi , i 6= j, (3.3)
where 0 ≤ Vz ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ Fz ≤ 1, z ∈ {i, j}. Parameters f and g govern the absolute
cost levels associated with the choices of Vi and Fi, while b, d > 1 determine the convexity
of the cost functions.5 We will denote the markup as µi ≡ Pi − gV di . It is the gross profit
per unit since gV di depicts the variable costs.
Firm i optimizes its two quality attributes and its price according to its first order condi-
tions. Therefore, it sets its attributes by analyzing the marginal effect between revenue and
cost. Changes in market share affect revenue as well as variable costs. We will discuss firm
i’s reaction functions hereafter in reference to a markup- and a quantity-effect.
3.3 Results
Based on the model framework introduced in Section 3.2, we will work out firm i’s optimal
reactions. This also reveals with which attributes firm j attacks most efficiently.
The following notations are required to read the results below correctly. Firm i provides
a high variable cost and a low fixed cost attribute in relation to firm j, if it is positioned at
the top left (strong in Vi) and the reverse at the bottom right (see Figure 3.2).6 Furthermore,
firm i is denoted with subscript D (Defender) and firm j with subscript A (Attacker).
In Lemma 3.1 we have shown that the second order derivative of firm D is necessary in
order to find its optimal reaction behavior. Thus, based on the profit function (3.3) results
∂2piD(ΩD,ΩA)
∂x∂y
=
∂2mD
∂x∂y
µD +
∂mD
∂y
∂µD
∂x
,
with x ∈ ΩD, y ∈ ΩA and µD ≡ PD − gV dD. The expression on the right hand side
(rhs) of the equation corresponds to the marginal change in net profit of firm D if attacked
by firm A. Specifically, firm D reacts to an attack with a profit maximizing adjustment of
its attributes. Hence, the analysis of an attack by firm A can be divided into two types of
effects.
Definition 3.1 (Quantity-Effect). Describes the change in the effect which x has on mD
due to a change in attribute y. Formally it is written as
∂2mD
∂x∂y
µD, x ∈ ΩD, y ∈ ΩA.
The second effect of firm D relates to its markup. It adjusts the marginal markup to
address an attack by firm A.
5The first order and the second order conditions of the profit function are derived in Appendices B.1 and
B.2.
6In practice, most incumbents in post markets or network industries are positioned at the bottom right.
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Definition 3.2 (Markup-Effect). Describes the change in the effect which y has on mD
due to the effect which x has on µD. Formally it is written as
∂mD
∂y
∂µD
∂x
, x ∈ ΩD, y ∈ ΩA.
Firm D’s markup-effect vanishes if it is calculated in terms of the fixed cost attribute
(∂µD/∂FD = 0).
Lemma 3.2. Reactions to attacks on firm D’s fixed cost attribute result in a quantity-effect
only.
Proof. Given the mixed second order derivative
∂2piD
∂x∂y
=
∂2mD
∂x∂y
+
∂mD
∂y
∂(PD − gV
d
D)
∂x
, x ∈ ΩD, y ∈ ΩA
with x ∈ ΩD and y ∈ ΩA. Then, the markup-effect on the rhs will vanish for x ≡ FD.
This completes the proof.
The results depend on the positions of the defending and the attacking firm. Therefore,
we distinguish two cases. First, firm D is positioned at the top left of firm A. Second, the
two firms are in reversed positions (see Figure 3.2).
To simplify the reading of the results, we mark quality attributes with an upper bar if
firm D provides a higher price adjusted quantity than firm A and with a lower bar if it pro-
vides a lower price adjusted quantity, respectively. The three abbreviations “aggr.”, “def.”
and “amb.” denote firm D’s behavior in terms of an attack by firm A. Aggressive behavior
implies an increase in firm D’s quality attributes or a decrease in its price. Therefore, defen-
sive behavior by firm D has reverse impacts and the behavior is ambiguous if markup- and
quantity-effects counteract each other. The threshold values m˜i,j = m˜j,i denote the market
share in the case of an attack on firm D’s attribute i (j) with attribute j (i) of firm A. These
thresholds exist and show a change in the sign of the quantity-effect. However, the entire
impact of an attack can already change its sign before the threshold values are reached if
the markup-effect outweighs the quantity-effect. Furthermore, we refer to the term “market
dominance of firm D” if its market share is higher than firm A’s market share and vice versa.
We call an attribute weak (strong) provided if the price adjusted quantity of firm D is lower
(higher) then the price adjusted quantity of firm A.
Yet, we have introduced the model and the necessary notations. By taking into account
Lemma 3.2, we can establish the two following effect tables based on the firm’s position.
Defending firm D is positioned at the Bottom Right
This section focuses on the case in which firm D is positioned at the bottom right in relation
to firm A (see Figure 3.2), i.e., it provides a strong fixed cost and a weak variable cost
attribute.
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Table 3.1: Reactions of firm D if positioned at the bottom right of firm A
Firm D reacts with
VD FD PD
mD > mA ⇒def. mD > m˜P,V ⇒ aggr.VA amb.
mD < mA ⇒aggr. mA > mD ⇒ amb.
mD > mA ⇒amb. mD > mA ⇒aggr.FA
mD < mA ⇒ aggr.
aggr.
mA > m˜P,F ⇒amb.
mD > m˜V,P ⇒aggr. mD > mA ⇒aggr. mD > 1− m˜P,P ⇒amb.PA
mA > mD ⇒amb. mA > m˜F,P ⇒def. mD < 1− m˜P,P ⇒aggr.
Fi
rm
A
a
tt
a
ck
s
w
ith
The following lemma states how firm D’s reactions change if it alters its position in
terms of firm A. Therefore, we take advantage of the Schwarz Theorem and separate the
derivatives into the two effects in Definition 3.1 and 3.2.
Lemma 3.3. The markup-effect is robust with respect to firm repositioning. The quantity-
effect changes its sign from negative to positive and vice versa if firm D changes its position
in terms of firm A.
Proof. See Appendix B.6.
The market share “stealing effect” — higher quality attributes or a lower price — re-
mains after a firm repositioning has taken place. The quantity-effect on the other hand
depends on the provided quantity of the price-adjusted attributes. Hence, it changes its sign
whenever firms change their position. Formally, the two implications can be proved based
on the relation mi = 1−mj .
The impact of Lemma 3.3 is necessary to derive the results in which firm D alters its
position in terms of firm A. Thus, the analysis recognizes the changing sign of the quantity-
effect.
Defending firm D is positioned at the Top Left
This section focuses on the case in which firm D is positioned at the top left in relation to
firm A (see Figure 3.2). Given this assumption, the following table summarizes firm D’s
reactions if attacked by firm A.
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Table 3.2: Reactions of firm D if positioned at the top left of firm A
Firm D reacts with
VD FD PD
mD > mA ⇒ aggr. mD > mA ⇒ aggr.VA aggr.
mD < mA ⇒ def. mA > m˜P,V ⇒ amb.
mD > mA ⇒ aggr. mD > m˜P,F ⇒ aggr.FA
mD < mA ⇒amb.
def.
mD 6 mA ⇒amb.
mD > mA ⇒ aggr. mD > m˜F,P ⇒aggr. mD > m˜P,P ⇒aggr.PA
mA > m˜V,P ⇒amb. mD 6 mA ⇒def. mD < m˜P,P ⇒amb.
Fi
rm
A
a
tt
a
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s
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The two derived tables conclude all reactions of firm D if the two firm’s position satisfies
the restriction in inequality (3.2). Next, we summarize the impact of these two tables.
Proposition 3.1 (Attack with Variable Cost Attribute). If firm A attacks with
(i) its strong variable cost attribute, then,
– firm D’s reaction if attacked on its weak variable cost attribute is ambiguous.
– firm D reacts defensively with its strong fixed cost attribute if it dominates the
market and it reacts aggressively otherwise.
– firm D reacts aggressively with its price if its market share exceeds a certain
market share threshold or the markup-effect outweighs the quantity-effect.
(ii) its weak variable cost attribute, then,
– firm D reacts always aggressively with its strong variable cost attribute.
– firm D reacts aggressively with its weak fixed cost attribute if it dominates the
market and defensively otherwise.
– firm D reacts aggressively with its price if it dominates the market.
Proof. See Appendix B.3.
Proposition 3.1 highlights that firm position matters. An attack as a market entrant
(mA < mD) with a strong variable cost attribute will force the incumbent to cut its strong
fixed cost attribute. Such a situation can be disadvantageous for both firms, for instance, if
the entrant takes advantage of a network based on access regulation (see Section 3.4).
Firm D’s reaction is ambiguous if the attack addresses its weak variable cost attribute.
Therefore, the markup- and quantity-effects counteract each other. Furthermore, if firm D
dominates the market significantly or the markup-effect outweighs the quantity-effect, it
will also compete with a price cut to attack firm A’s variable cost attribute.
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The implications are different if, instead, the attacking firm provides a weak variable
cost attribute. Then, the dominant firm D reacts with both attributes and price aggressively
to attacks. As a result, the attacking firm has to expect hard competition with firm D.
Proposition 3.2 (Attack with Fixed Cost Attribute). If firm A attacks with
(i) its weak fixed cost attribute, then,
– firm D’s reaction with its weak variable cost attribute is ambiguous if it domi-
nates the market. It reacts aggressively if firm A dominates the market.
– firm D reacts always aggressively with its strong fixed cost attribute.
– firm D reacts aggressively with its price if it dominates the market or the markup-
effect outweighs the quantity-effect.
(ii) its strong fixed cost attribute, then,
– firm D reacts aggressively with its strong variable cost attribute if it dominates
the market. Otherwise, firm D’s behavior relies on the size of markup-effect and
quantity-effect.
– firm D reacts always defensively if attacked on its weak fixed cost attribute.
– firm D reacts aggressively with respect to a price increase if its market share
exceeds a certain threshold or the markup-effect outweighs the quantity-effect.
Proof. See Appendix B.4.
Proposition 3.2 confirms again, that firm D’s position is crucial. Provided firm A attacks
with its weak fixed cost attribute, then firm D will always compete with its strong fixed cost
attribute. It also reacts aggressively with its price if it dominates the market. If firm D is
attacked on its weak variable cost attribute and firm A dominates the market, firm D will
increase its variable cost attribute. If firm D dominates the market, the reaction depends on
the markup-effect and on the quantity-effect.
If firm A attacks with a strong fixed cost attribute and firm D dominates the market,
then, firm A will be exposed to a higher competition in terms of the variable cost attribute.
Firm D cuts its weak fixed cost attribute if attacked with the strong fixed cost attribute of
firm A. Furthermore, firm D will react aggressively with its price if it dominates the market
significantly or the markup-effect outweighs the quantity-effect.
Proposition 3.3 (Attack with Price). If firm A attacks with a lower price, then,
- firm D reacts aggressively with its variable cost attribute if it dominates the market.
- firm D reacts aggressively with its fixed cost attribute if it dominates the market.
- firm D positioned at the bottom right reacts aggressively with its own price if its
market share is lower than the threshold 1− m˜P,P . It also reacts aggressively if it is
positioned at the top left and its market share is higher than m˜P,P . However, these two
reactions also occur in any case if the markup-effect outweighs the quantity-effect.
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Proof. See Appendix B.5.
Before analyzing the implications of Proposition 3.3, we must emphasize that price
changes affect the relative size of the provided attributes as well. Apart from one excep-
tion, firm D always reacts aggressively with its attributes if attacked with firm A’s price.
Nonetheless, the reaction with regard to firm D’s price is ambiguous if firm D is positioned
at the bottom right. In this case, the markup-effect is positive whereas the quantity-effect is
negative. But even in this case firm D will react aggressively if the markup-effect outweighs
the quantity-effect. Firm A’s entry into the market with a price attack might be hazardous
unless it has already obtained a significant market share.
We will now apply these theoretical results to real-world examples.
3.4 Implications
Our modifications of the defender model can be applied to specific industries with particular
cost structures and market share distributions. Most of the markets which recently moved
towards liberalization (e.g., postal, electricity, telecommunications) provide straightforward
applications for the case when firms with high fixed costs are attacked. It is more challeng-
ing to identify industries in which an incumbent provides a technology that imposes mainly
variable costs. In such markets, potential competitors can enter with lower risk, hence, a
higher degree of competition can be expected in these markets.
In what follows, we will discuss two real-world industries in which the incumbent op-
erates with a high fixed cost technology and will be attacked by an entrant that provides a
technology that mainly imposes variable costs. This corresponds to the situation in which
firm D is positioned at the bottom right of firm A. Specifically, we will apply the defender
model on the postal sector and on the telecommunications industry.
The postal sector has traditionally relied on a reserved area to finance universal ser-
vice obligations. In recent years, it has been increasingly opened up to competition in
many countries. There is limited literature on competitive entry strategies in postal mar-
kets. Based on a game-theory model and interviews with market participants, Dietl and
Waller (2002) argue that competition in letter markets lead to new services and lower, but
differentiated prices. While businesses and customers in urban areas will benefit from price
decreases, households and rural areas will face higher prices. New business models such
as mass mail providers, networked mail services, and consolidations with differentiated
services will emerge, targeting selected segments of the market. Incumbents will have to
significantly change their behavior, become more efficient, and tailor their services to in-
dividual needs. The interaction between competition and universal service regulation has
been studied by Crew and Kleindorfer (2001, 2007). Dietl, Trinkner, and Bleisch (2005)
and Jaag (2007) provide applications to the mail market in Switzerland. Kleindorfer and
Szirmay (2009) review pricing practices of incumbent postal operators in Europe in the
context of liberalization, but they also recognize the rudimentary state of applied marketing
practices and capabilities.
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In the European Union, member states must fully liberalize their postal markets by the
year 2013. In 1993, Sweden was one of the first European countries to open their letter mail
market. In 2013, Sweden Post still dominates the postal market. It offers a broad product
range of services and delivers mail every business day countrywide. Bring CityMail is the
only important competitor. It started operations in 1991 as an independent operator. Today,
it is owned by Norway Post, the public operator of Norway. Bring CityMail only delivers
electronically-generated bulk mail to Sweden’s largest cities, i.e., to about 40 percent of
all Swedish households. It delivers mail twice per week. Therefore, it only competes with
economy bulk mail offered by Sweden Post. Hence, it has chosen a very selective market
entry strategy by focusing on the most attractive (least cost) product segment and the most
densely populated (again least cost) delivery areas.
Cohen et al. (2007) discuss the impact of competitive entries into the Swedish postal
market. They find that almost immediately after Bring CityMail entered the market, Sweden
Post began to adjust its pricing structure by introducing discounts for bulk and presorted
mail. Its bulk mail prices have decreased, reflecting the intense competition from Bring
CityMail, while the prices of uncontested single-piece items have increased. This behavior
is consistent with the analysis of the defender model.
Jaag et al. (2012) apply a simple version of the defender model with two quality dimen-
sions to the postal sector. They find that the incumbent is most effective if it reacts to the
weak quality dimension. Hence, quality adjustment in this dimension dominates the reac-
tion in price. By contrast, if an incumbent is relatively weak on the variable cost attribute,
a low-price attack on this attribute harms the incumbent the most. However, it can be ren-
dered less attractive to the attacker if an incumbent threatens to lower prices or strengthen
its own product quality.
The theoretical defender model developed in this essay widely confirms these implica-
tions. Additionally, the results state that an entrant’s attack with its strong variable cost at-
tribute induces the incumbent to decrease its strong fixed cost attribute. That undermines the
service provision of the less dense populated and rural areas. However, an attack with the
entrant’s fixed cost attribute encourages the incumbent to increase its fixed cost attribute as
well. If either firm invests in their fixed cost attributes, competition will encourage the mar-
ket participants to increase the attractiveness of their own fixed cost technology. Whether a
price attack by the entrant tends to be successful depends on the quantity-effect and on the
markup-effect and therefore on the specific market structure.
The defender model also helps explain observed investment behaviors in the telecom-
munications industry. Like the postal sector, the telecommunications industry is often com-
prised of a small number of market participants among which one used to be a government
monopolist. Furthermore, incumbents need to invest significant capital to build and main-
tain their network.
Entrants have to make large up-front investments unless access regulation is provided.
The construction of a network necessitates tremendous investment costs with no certainty
regarding future events. Government intervention can mitigate these risks. For instance,
the European Union opened telecommunications to competition by other retailers by un-
bundling elements of the incumbent’s network. This intervention was justified by an ex-
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pected increase in competition in the retail market and therefore lower prices which would
create a higher consumer surplus. However, although access regulation might increase com-
petition and lower prices, it might also undermine investment incentives over time.7 Grajek
and Ro¨ller (2012) name this relationship the “regulation/investment trade-off”.8 With regu-
lated access, entrants can rely on an existing network at mandated prices and they need not
duplicate it.9
The controversial question whether access to networks should be provided or not has
been intensively discussed in the literature. The contribution by Guthrie (2006) surveys
the literature on the implications of different regulation schemes. In particular, it posits
the relevance of modern investment theory, focusing on risk and intertemporal investment
incentives. In a recent work, Hausman and Taylor (2012) discuss whether regulation in
network markets is necessary at all and how high mandated access prices should be. Val-
letti (2003) highlights the linkage between access pricing and incentives to invest. Nitsche
and Wiethaus (2011) examine to what extent different types of access regulation to Next
Generation Networks affect investments and consumer welfare.
Stu¨hmeier (2013) investigates incumbent’s and entrant’s advantages in the telecommu-
nications industry based on two widely proposed regulatory regimes: a cost-based regu-
lation and a reciprocal regulation. Incumbents enjoy a demand-side advantage whereas
entrants may enjoy a supply-side advantage due to higher efficiency that bases on better
opportunities to adapt new and innovative technologies. Gruber and Koutroumpis (2013)
show that firm and intra-platform competition on the incumbent’s legacy network stimu-
lates the adoption of broadband what they have not found for different access technologies.
Their empirical evidence bases on data from 167 broadband markets over a period of 11
years. Grajek and Ro¨ller (2012) provide evidence for the regulation/investment trade-off
by a data set which covers more than 70 fixed-line operators in 20 countries over 10 years.
Briglauer, Ecker, and Gugler (2012) come up with another empirical study in which they
extract the determinants of Next Generation Access (NGA) deployment with data from the
27 European Union member states for the years 2005 to 2010. They reveal with their study
7Gans and King (2004) discuss an approach to solve the truncation problem of risky investments. They
establish conditions under which an access holiday (a fixed period free of regulated access) can improve in-
vestment incentives. Based on Next Generation Access Networks, Inderst and Peitz (2012) investigate the
impact of different contract types and access regulation on innovation and competition in the telecommunica-
tions industry. They find that ex-post access contracts prevent a duplication of investment more often and lead
to a wider roll-out compared with markets in which such contracts are not available. Ex-ante contracts on the
other hand provide an even wider roll-out than ex-post contracts and lead to an even less frequent duplication
of investments. Nonetheless, ex-ante and ex-post contracts can also be used to dampen competition.
8A special case of this trade-off is highlighted by the so-called ladder hypothesis of investment (Cave
and Vogelsang 2003; Cave 2006a,b), also referred to as the stepping stone hypothesis by Rosston and Noll
(2002). The ladder hypothesis states that easy access is needed to incentivize entries and higher infrastructure
investments in the long run.
9Vogelsang (2003) presents a profound analysis of network access and interconnection with its underlying
pricing method. Starting with the Baumwol-Willig efficient component pricing rule (ECPR), Armstrong,
Doyle, and Vickers (1996) analyze the notion of the “opportunity cost” under various assumptions. They
show that the Ramsey approach to access pricing is closely related to the ECPR provided the opportunity cost
is correctly interpreted.
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that stricter ex-ante broadband access regulation has a negative impact on NGA deploy-
ment, whereas competitive pressure from broadband and mobile affects NGA deployment
in an inverted U-shaped manner. Hence, they find also empirical evidence for the above
mentioned trade-off. Furthermore, they expect that the large investments required to estab-
lish a reasonable NGA roll-out will not elicit with the cost-based access regulation of the
European Commission.
The trade-off is reflected in the choice between a facilities-based competition (entrants
invest in their own network) and a service-based competition (incumbent must grant access
to its network). Policy makers posit that facilities-based competition is more advantageous
than service-based competition. For instance, they mention that facilities-based competi-
tion provides higher variety, lower long-term pricing, and more innovation whereas service-
based competition would only promote lower prices that result from regulatory intervention.
Ho¨ffler (2007) supports the government preference for facilities-based competition with an
empirical study that provides evidence from broadband networks. He shows that infras-
tructure competition between Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) and cable TV had a significant
positive impact on broadband penetration. The European Commission (2007) announced
a position that favorably describes facilities-based competition: “empirical evidence shows
that investment and innovation are strongest where there is effective competition between
infrastructures. However, there is still no infrastructure-based competition on around 80%
of the EU’s local loops. This means that ex-ante regulation continues to play a crucial role
in maintaining competition and protecting consumers by setting conditions for access to the
incumbent’s infrastructure.” Focusing on these insights, finding incentives for infrastructure
investment is a key policy issue.
Huigen and Cave (2008) compare the deregulatory approach in the United States with
the regulatory approach widely adopted in the European Union. They find that investment
incentives are weaker where there is only one network in which services will be provided.
Focusing on the European Union territory, they analyze the prospects for competition in
wireless and municipal networks and recommend that steps be taken to mobilize incentives
to invest in NGA networks where competition works. If there is a lack of competition,
policy makers must consider conditions to incentivize investments. Duso and Ro¨ller (2003)
support a more critical point of view on deregulation. They treat deregulation across OECD
countries as exogenous and explore its competitive impact on productivity which they find
as significantly overestimated.
The most recent challenge in terms of regulated network access deals with the current
fibre-optic roll-out in many industrialized countries. Like the copper cable network, it is
likely that the fibre-optic network will be regulated in the future and prices will become
mandated.10 Then, firms that invest in a fibre-optic network today would have to grant
access to their network for competitors after a certain period of time. The price would then
be set ex-ante by the regulating authority. A facilities-based approach would necessarily
lead to a duplication of the infrastructure whereas regulated access would undermine the
10The two companion papers by Laffont, Rey, and Tirole (1998a,b) provide an insightful overview to
network competition and the underlying pricing rule.
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investment incentive by the incumbent.11
Grajek and Ro¨ller (2012) employ an empirical framework that identifies the effects of
access regulation while assuming that the incumbent’s and entrant’s investment decisions
are interdependent and investment incentives are not necessarily aligned. Their setting
characterizes the incumbent’s and entrant’s investments as substitutes or as complements.12
In addition to indications about the regulation/investment trade-off they find a regulatory
commitment problem since higher investments by incumbents encourage regulated access
provisions.13 With our extended defender model, we establish a consistent explanation
for the regulation/investment trade-off and its empirical evidence provided by Grajek and
Ro¨ller.
Suppose the scenario in which the incumbent’s position (firm D) is at the bottom right
(i.e., relatively strong fixed cost and weak variable cost) and network access is regulated.
It results a service-based competition in which the entrant relies on the incumbent’s net-
work and need not bear the fixed costs to build its own network. Hence, it can focus on
investments for services which base on a technology that imposes mainly variable costs.
Table 3.1 shows the incumbent’s reactions and reflects the regulation/investment trade-off:
attacked with the entrant’s high provided variable cost attribute, the incumbent will cut its
investments in its network infrastructure (fixed cost attribute). Hence, the incumbent’s in-
centive to invest and maintain its network will be weakened. This might be detrimental
for both parties and the customers in the retail market as well. Table 3.1 also reveals the
facilities-based competition. This scenario results if the entrant attacks with its low pro-
vided fixed cost attribute and the incumbent reacts with an increase of its investment in its
network (fixed cost attribute). Therefore, network competition encourages the incumbent
to increase the quality and maintenance of its network. Table 3.1 consistently proves the
investment behavior in a facilities-based as well as in a service-based competition that has
been addressed empirically by Grajek and Ro¨ller (2012) and Briglauer, Ecker, and Gugler
(2012).
Furthermore, the incumbent competes with a lower price if there is facilities-based com-
petition. If service-based competition takes place and the incumbent reaches a certain mar-
ket share threshold, there will be competition in price as well. The incumbent’s reaction
to an entrant’s low price strategy is ambiguous, depending on the markup-effect and on the
quantity-effect.
11Cave (2007) illuminates the debate about the fibre-optic roll-out and the related regulation issues, de-
scribing how the European regulatory framework approaches it.
12Buehler and Wey (2013) work out conditions under which a state-owned firm with a political agenda
strategically crowds out investment by a private firm. They apply a two step procedure to identify a possi-
ble crowding out in the telecommunications industry. Specifically, they investigate the construction of the
fibre-optic network roll-out in industrialized countries. In Switzerland, for instance, they provide anecdotal
evidence that the two investments are strategic complements rather than substitutes what makes a crowding
out unlikely to occur.
13Armstrong and Sappington (2006) discuss whether and how regulators can introduce competition in
regulated markets. They distinguish procompetitive and anticompetitive liberalization policies.
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3.5 Conclusion
We have given the original defender model more structure by explicitly modeling the costs
associated with quality attributes, showing that firms compete in three dimensions, two
quality attributes and price. The two quality attributes induce fixed and variable costs. This
setting allows us to derive defensive strategies in terms of industry specific market and cost
structures in a tractable framework.
The defender model best explains markets in which a dominant firm operates with a
technology that induces mainly fixed costs and entrants focus their activity on low cost
technologies. For such markets, we derive rich insights into how incumbents and entrants
should optimally behave.
We provide two applications that highlight our results. The first application analyzes
the market for letter mail which has recently been opened to competition in most European
countries. This has forced incumbent postal operators to (re)position themselves strategi-
cally. In this context, our results extend the literature on competition in liberalized postal
markets by combining pricing and positioning strategies from a marketing perspective.
The second application focuses on the telecommunications industry in general and Next
Generation Networks (e.g., fibre-optic roll-out) in particular. To the best of our knowl-
edge, our research is unique in addressing these questions by the application of the de-
fender model. Our model theoretically confirms the empirical evidence of the regula-
tion/investment trade-off by Grajek and Ro¨ller (2012) and Briglauer, Ecker, and Gugler
(2012). This trade-off states that access regulation might increase competition and lower
prices but it might also undermine investment incentives over time.
Based on the case in which the incumbent provides technology that imposes high fixed
costs, we show that the incumbent’s incentive to invest in its network declines if the entrant
focuses its investment on variable cost technologies. This is service-based competition.
Facilities-based competition results if an entrant attacks with an investment in an own net-
work. This encourages the incumbent to increase its investment in the network as well,
resulting in better infrastructure and maintenance. Moreover, the incumbent lowers prices
if a facilities-based competition takes place.
Our analysis highlights the importance of the strategic aspects of market defense. Of
course, additional attributes and more detailed cost structures could enhance and also com-
plicate the analysis. We leave these developments to future research.
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Appendix B
B.1 First Order Conditions
By analyzing the three first order conditions
∂piD
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=
∂mD
∂x
(
PD − gV
d
D
)
+mD
∂
(
PD − gV
d
D
)
∂x
−
∂(fF bD)
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= 0,
with x ∈ ΩD, it turns out that the markup PD − gV dD has to be positive since the first order
derivatives of firm D’s market share ∂mD/∂x, x ∈ ΩD are positive for the derivatives
with respect to the two quality attributes and negative for the derivative with respect to
the price of firm D. With the relationship mD = 1 − mA these derivatives are given as
dmD/dx = −dmA/dx, x ∈ ΩD, where dmD/dx is given in equations (B.4) to (B.6).
The marginal market share of firm D with respect to firm A’s quality attributes is nega-
tive whereas it is positive for its price.
∂mD
∂VA
=
2
pi
FD
PD
− FA
PA
PA
[(
FA
PA
− FD
PD
)2
+
(
VD
PD
− VA
PA
)2] < 0 (B.4)
∂mD
∂FA
=
2
pi
VA
PA
− VD
PD
PA
[(
FA
PA
− FD
PD
)2
+
(
VD
PD
− VA
PA
)2] < 0 (B.5)
∂mD
∂PA
=
2
pi
(
VD
PD
FA
PA
− VA
PA
FD
PD
)
PA
[(
FA
PA
− FD
PD
)2
+
(
VD
PD
− VA
PA
)2] > 0. (B.6)
Keep this in mind for the following proofs of Proposition 3.1 to 3.3.
B.2 Second Order Conditions
The total derivatives in equation (3.1) require that ∂2piD/∂x2 < 0, x ∈ Ω∗D to ensure a
maximum at position x. In what follows we show the conditions which guarantee that this
is fulfilled for the closed-form profit function in equation (3.3). Note that ∂2mD/∂V 2D is
negative (positive) if firm D is positioned at the top left (bottom right) and ∂2mD/∂F 2D
is positive (negative) if firm D is positioned at the top left (bottom right). Furthermore,
∂2mD/∂P
2
D is ambiguous, ∂mD/∂VD > 0, ∂mD/∂FD > 0 and ∂mD/∂PD < 0.
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First quality attribute
The second order condition of piD in respect to VD is given as
∂2piD
∂V 2D
=
∂2mD
∂V 2D
(
PD − gV
d
D
)
− 2
∂mD
∂VD
gdV d−1D −mDgd(d− 1)V
d−2
D .
The above second order derivative is negative at the top left of firm D. It is also negative at
the bottom right of firm D, if the two negative terms on the rhs outweigh the first term.
Second quality attribute
The second order condition of piD in respect to FD is given as
∂2piD
∂F 2D
=
∂2mD
∂F 2D
(
PD − gV
d
D
)
− f(b− 1)bF b−2D .
The above second order derivative is negative at the bottom right of firm D. It is also nega-
tive at the top left of firm D if the second term on the rhs outweighs the first term.
Incumbent’s price
The second order condition of piD in respect to PD results as
∂2piD
∂P 2D
=
∂2mD
∂P 2D
(
PD − gV
d
D
)
+ 2
∂mD
∂PD
.
The sum of the negative second term and the first term on the rhs has to be negative in order
to obtain a maximum in equation (3.1).
B.3 Proof of Proposition 3.1
The following analysis assumes Firm D to be positioned at the top left of firm A. If firm D
is positioned at the bottom right instead, the quantity-effect will change its sign.
Attacked on VD: We find the reaction of firm D by analyzing the mixed second order
derivative
∂2piD
∂VD∂VA
=
∂2mD
∂VD∂VA
(
PD − gV
d
D
)
− gdV d−1D
∂mD
∂VA
.
The markup-effect is positive (see equation B.4) whereas the sign of the quantity-effect
corresponds to
∂2mD
∂VD∂VA
=
2
pi
2
(
VD
PD
− VA
PA
)(
FA
PA
− FD
PD
)
PDPA
[(
FA
PA
− FD
PD
)2
+
(
VD
PD
− VA
PA
)2]2 > 0.
This completes the proof of an attack on firm D’s variable cost attribute in Proposition 3.1.
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Attacked on FD: We find the reaction of firm D by analyzing the mixed second order
derivative
∂2piD
∂FD∂VA
=
∂2mD
∂FD∂VA
(
PD − gV
d
D
)
.
The markup-effect vanishes since fixed costs do not rely on the quantity and the sign of the
quantity-effect corresponds to
∂2mD
∂FD∂VA
=
2
pi
(
VD
PD
− VA
PA
)2
−
(
FA
PA
− FD
PD
)2
PDPA
[(
FA
PA
− FD
PD
)2
+
(
VD
PD
− VA
PA
)2]2 R 0.
Straightforward calculations yield
∂2mD
∂FD∂VA
R 0 ⇔ mD =
2
pi
arctan
(
VD
PD
− VA
PA
FA
PA
− FD
PD
)
R
1
2
.
Proposition 3.1 follows then immediately.
Attacked on PD: We find the reaction of firm D by analyzing the mixed second order
derivative
∂2piD
∂PD∂VA
=
∂2mD
∂PD∂VA
(
PD − gV
d
D
)
+
∂mD
∂VA
.
Equation (B.6) states that the markup-effect is negative. The quantity-effect is given as
∂2mD
∂PD∂VA
=
2
pi
FD
PD
[(
FD
PD
− FA
PA
)2
+
(
V 2D
P 2
D
−
V 2A
P 2
A
)]
− 2VD
PD
FA
PA
(
VD
PD
− VA
PA
)
PDPA
[(
FA
PA
− FD
PD
)2
+
(
VD
PD
− VA
PA
)2]2 .
For the proof we define xi ≡ Vi/Pi, yi ≡ Fi/Pi with i ∈ {D,A} and assume xD − xA >
yA − yD > 0 (corresponds to a market share mD > mA). Then, we derive the condition
yD
[
(yA − yD)
2 − (xD − xA)
((
2
yA
yD
− 1
)
xD − xA
)]
< 0.
This holds true because (2yA/yD − 1) xD − xA > xD − xA > yA − yD > 0. Therefore,
given mD > mA it is ∂2mD/(∂PD∂VA) < 0. For mA > mD the derivative may become
positive above a certain threshold mA > m˜P,V .
This proves the reaction of firm D if attacked on its price.
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B.4 Proof of Proposition 3.2
The following analysis assumes Firm D to be positioned at the top left of firm A. If firm D
is positioned at the bottom right instead, the quantity-effect will change its sign.
Attacked on VD: We find the reaction of firm D by analyzing the mixed second order
derivative
∂2piD
∂VD∂FA
=
∂2mD
∂VD∂FA
(
PD − gV
d
D
)
− gdV d−1D
∂mD
∂FA
.
Equation (B.5) proves that the markup-effect is positive. The quantity-effect corresponds
to
∂2mD
∂VD∂FA
=
2
pi
(
VD
PD
− VA
PA
)2
−
(
FA
PA
− FD
PD
)2
PDPA
[(
FA
PA
− FD
PD
)2
+
(
VD
PD
− VA
PA
)2]2 R 0.
Straightforward calculations yield
∂2mD
∂VD∂FA
R 0 ⇔ mD =
2
pi
arctan
(
VD
PD
− VA
PA
FA
PA
− FD
PD
)
R
1
2
.
It follows the reaction of firm D if attacked on its variable cost attribute.
Attacked on FD: We find the reaction of firm D by analyzing the mixed second order
derivative
∂2piD
∂FD∂FA
=
∂2mD
∂FD∂FA
(
PD − gV
d
D
)
.
The markup-effect vanishes since fixed costs do not rely on quantity. The quantity-effect
corresponds to
∂2mD
∂FD∂FA
=
2
(
VA
PA
− VD
PD
)(
FA
PA
− FD
PD
)
PDPA
[(
FA
PA
− FD
PD
)2
+
(
VD
PD
− VA
PA
)2]2 < 0.
This completes the proof of firm D’s reaction if attacked on its fixed cost attribute.
Attacked on PD: We find the reaction of firm D by analyzing the mixed second order
derivative
∂2piD
∂PD∂FA
=
∂2mD
∂PD∂FA
(
PD − gV
d
D
)
+
∂mD
∂FA
.
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Equation (B.5) proves that the markup-effect is negative. The quantity-effect denotes as
∂2mD
∂PD∂FA
= −
2
pi
VD
PD
[(
VD
PD
− VA
PA
)2
−
(
F 2
A
P 2
A
−
F 2
D
P 2
D
)]
+ 2VA
PA
FD
PD
(
FA
PA
− FD
PD
)
PDPA
[(
FA
PA
− FD
PD
)2
+
(
VD
PD
− VA
PA
)2]2 .
Again, we define xi ≡ Vi/Pi, yi ≡ Fi/Pi with i ∈ {D,A} and assume yA − yD >
xD − xA > 0 (corresponds to a market share mA > mD). Then, we derive the condition
−xD
[
(xD − xA)
2 − (yA − yD)
(
yA +
(
1 + 2
xA
xD
)
yD
)]
> 0.
This is given since yA + (1 + 2xA/xD) yD > yA − yD > xD − xA. Therefore, given
mA > mD it is ∂2mD/(∂PD∂FA) > 0. For mD > mA the derivative may become negative
above a certain threshold mD > m˜P,F .
This proves the reaction of firm D if attacked on its price.
B.5 Proof of Proposition 3.3
The following analysis assumes Firm D to be positioned at the top left of firm A. If firm D
is positioned at the bottom right instead, the quantity-effect will change its sign.
Attacked on VD: We find the reaction of firm D by analyzing the mixed second order
derivative
∂2piD
∂VD∂PA
=
∂2mD
∂VD∂PA
(
PD − gV
d
D
)
− gdV d−1D
∂mD
∂PA
.
Equation (B.6) proves the negative markup-effect. The quantity-effect results as
∂2mD
∂VD∂PA
=
2
pi
FA
PA
[(
FA
PA
− FD
PD
)2
−
(
V 2
D
P 2
D
−
V 2
A
P 2
A
)]
+ 2VA
PA
FD
PD
(
VD
PD
− VA
PA
)
PDPA
[(
FA
PA
− FD
PD
)2
+
(
VD
PD
− VA
PA
)2]2 .
To prove the sign of this mixed derivative, we define xi ≡ Vi/Pi, yi ≡ Fi/Pi with i ∈
{D,A} and assume xD − xA > yA − yD > 0 (corresponds to a market share mD > mA).
By reformulating the nominator to
yA
[
(yA − yD)
2 − (xD − xA)
(
xD −
(
2
yD
yA
− 1
)
xA
)]
< 0
we see that it is always negative. This follows since xD − (2yD/yA − 1)xA > xD − xA >
yA − yD. Therefore, given mD > mA it is ∂2mD/(∂VD∂PA) < 0. For mA > mD the
derivative may become positive above a certain threshold mA > m˜V,P .
This completes the proof of an attack on firm D’s variable cost attribute.
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Attacked on FD: We find the reaction of firm D by analyzing the mixed second order
derivative
∂2piD
∂FD∂PA
=
∂2mD
∂FD∂PA
(
PD − gV
d
D
)
.
The markup-effect vanishes since fixed costs do not rely on the provided quantity. There-
fore, the quantity-effect denotes as:
∂2mD
∂FD∂PA
= −
2
pi
VA
PA
[(
VA
PA
− VD
PD
)2
−
(
F 2D
P 2
D
−
F 2A
P 2
A
)]
+ 2VD
PD
FA
PA
(
FD
PD
− FA
PA
)
PDPA
[(
FA
PA
− FD
PD
)2
+
(
VD
PD
− VA
PA
)2]2 .
We define xi ≡ Vi/Pi, yi ≡ Fi/Pi with i ∈ {D,A} and assume yA − yD > xD − xA > 0
(corresponds to a market share mA > mD). By reformulating the nominator to
−xA
[
(xD − xA)
2 − (yA − yD)
((
2
xD
xA
− 1
)
yA − yD
)]
> 0
we see that it is always negative since (2xD/xA − 1) yA − yD > yA − yD > xD − xA.
Therefore, given mA > mD it is ∂2mD/(∂FD∂PA) > 0. For mD > mA the derivative may
become negative above a certain threshold mD > m˜F,P .
This proves the reaction by firm D if attacked on its fixed cost attribute.
Attacked on PD: We find the reaction of firm D by analyzing the mixed second order
derivative
∂2piD
∂PD∂PA
=
∂2mD
∂PD∂PA
(
PD − gV
d
D
)
+
∂mD
∂PA
.
Equation (B.6) proves that the markup-effect is positive. The quantity-effect is given as
∂2mD
∂PD∂PA
=
2
pi
(
VD
PD
FA
PA
− VA
PA
FD
PD
) [(
V 2D
P 2
D
+
F 2D
P 2
D
)
−
(
V 2A
P 2
A
+
F 2A
P 2
A
)]
PDPA
[(
FA
PA
− FD
PD
)2
+
(
VD
PD
− VA
PA
)2]2 R 0.
The expression in nominator’s first bracket is positive.
Again, we define xi ≡ Vi/Pi and yi ≡ Fi/Pi with i ∈ {D,A}. Then, the expression in
nominator’s second bracket can be written as
mD R
2
pi
arctan
(
yD + yA
xD + xA
)
= m˜P,P ⇔
∂2mD
∂PD∂PA
R 0.
This proves the reaction of firm D if attacked on its price.
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B.6 Proof of Lemma 3.3
We already now that the relationship mD = 1 − mA holds. Furthermore, the Schwarz
Theorem states that if f : Rn → R has continuous second partial derivatives at any given
point Rn, say, (a1, . . . , an), then for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n,
∂2f
∂xi∂xj
(a1, . . . , an) =
∂2f
∂xj∂xi
(a1, . . . , an).
Based on this theorem we can formulate the following two relationships:
∂mj
∂x
= −
∂mi
∂x
∂2mj
∂y∂x
= −
∂2mi
∂x∂y
,
where i, j ∈ {D,A}, x ∈ ΩD and y ∈ ΩA. This proves Lemma 3.3.
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